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NOTES
REJECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY: NLRB
V BILDISCO & BILDISCO AND
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code)' contains a detailed scheme
designed to allow a debtor to avoid liquidation through reorganization or
rehabilitation of the troubled business.2 Under the supervision of the
bankruptcy court, 3 a trustee 4 or debtor in possession' is required to perform certain statutorily created duties. These include filing a reorganiza1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982). Title I of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982), applies to cases filed on and after October 1, 1979. It repealed
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at I I U.S.C. §§ I1103 (1976) (repealed 1978)). For a summary of the Reform Act's history, see Kennedy,
Foreword-A BriefHistory of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C.L. REv. 667 (1980). For a
more detailed explication of a chapter II rehabilitation, see Comment, Business Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. An Analysis of Chapter 11, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 961.
2. Further, this scheme preserves the employees' jobs as well as the interests of both
creditors and shareholders. See infra note 16. A financially distressed corporation has two
options under title 11 of the United States Code. It may petition for bankruptcy under
chapter 7, which entails liquidation and a distribution of the proceeds to the creditors. II
U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1982). The company can also file under chapter 11, which contemplates
a reorganization and continuation of the business. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982). In either
case, after the prebankruptcy petition is filed, all creditors' claims against the debtor are
automatically stayed. 1 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). This is the crucial "breathing spell" granted
the financially distressed company. It allows the court-appointed trustee or debtor in possession to confer with the creditors to establish a mutually satisfactory plan of rehabilitation.
See Il U.S.C. § 1103 (1982).
3. See II U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
4. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1104, 1108 (1982). At any time after the commencement of the reorganization case, but before the confirmation of the rehabilitation
plan, see infra note 6, on request of a party in interest, the court will appoint a trustee to
manage the business. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). This trustee must consult with the
creditors' committee as soon as practicable. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(d), (c)(l) (1982). The trustee
must also file with the court a list of the debtor's creditors and a statement of the financial
status of the company. See II U.S.C. §§ 521(1), 1106(a)(2) (1982). Further, the court appointee must investigate the financial condition of the debtor, the operations of the debtor,
and the desirability of continuing the business. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 329, 521(2), 1106(a)(3)
(1982). The trustee is also accountable for all property received and the application of the
estate property. See II U.S.C. §§ 345, 363(c), 1106(a)(1) (1982). Although the above is not
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tion plan as soon as practicable and using the mechanisms provided by the
Code to allow the debtor temporary relief from creditors' actions.6 One of
the devices that the trustee or debtor in possession may invoke to improve
the financial condition of the company is provided by section 365(a) of the
Code. This statutory provision permits rejection of an executory contract
that is financially burdensome to the reorganizing enterprise.7
The policies and provisions of federal labor legislation conflict with the
an exhaustive list of the trustee's duties, it does reveal the extensiveness of the
responsibilities.
5. See generally II U.S.C. § 1107 (1982) (with certain limitations, a debtor in possession has the same rights and duties as a trustee). A debtor in possession "means debtor
except when a person that has qualified [as a trustee] ... is serving ... in the case." 11
U.S.C. § 1101 (1982). The debtor in possession virtually is placed in the shoes of a trustee.
He
"The debtor [in possession] is given the rights and powers of a chapter 11 trustee ....
is also subject to any limitations on a chapter 11 trustee, and to such other limitations and
conditions as the court prescribes." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 404 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6360.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(5) (1982). "The plan determines how much creditors will be
paid, and in what form (cash, property, or securities, for example); whether the stockholders
will continue to retain any interest in the company; and in what form the business will
continue (without several unprofitable divisions, for example)." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 221, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6180. The
debtor in possession also has the exclusive right to negotiate a rehabilitation plan with the
creditors' and equity security holders' committees for 120 days or as long as the court deems
appropriate. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b), (d) (1982). In a chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor in possession or trustee may assume or reject the contract "at any time before the confirmation of a
plan, but the court, on request of any party to such contract. . . may order the trustee to
determine within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract .... "
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982). By contrast, in a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, the trustee
or debtor in possession has only 60 days from the order for relief to assume or reject the
contract; otherwise, it is deemed rejected. II U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1982). Comparison of
these statutory provisions reveals Congress' greater interest in the success of the reorganization procedure for the legislators granted the chapter 11 trustee a longer period for consideration of whether or not to reject the contract due to the possibility of a rejection of a
beneficial contract. For duties of the debtor in possession or a trustee in a reorganization
case, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106-1107 (1982).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). Section 365(a) provides: "Except as provided in sections
765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject
to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor." The power of the debtor in possession to reject an executory contract under
§ 365(a) is derived from § 1107(a), which provides that "a debtor in possession shall have all
the rights . . . of a trustee serving in a [chapter 11 reorganization] case .... " 11 U.S.C.
§ 1107(a) (1982). As will be discussed infra, section 365(a) has been superseded with respect
to the rejection of collective bargaining agreements by § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. See infra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
Despite the myriad of rules under the Code for a proper reorganization, it should be
recognized that, to effectuate the policies of the Code, "[t]he hallmark of Chapter I1 is flexibility." 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1100.01 (15th ed. 1983); see Brotherhood of Ry.,
Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 168-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
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Code's grant of flexibility to the debtor in possession. Federal labor legislation is directed toward the goal of industrial peace through the promotion of collective bargaining.' The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) 9 was enacted to promote collective bargaining and thereby ensure
industrial peace.'" Experience has shown that the refusal by employers to
accept the process of collective bargaining will necessarily lead to industrial strife and a consequent obstruction of the free flow of commerce.''
8. See infra note 11. Section 8(d) of the NLRA defines collective bargaining as "the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representatives of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
9. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1982)).
10. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., ist Sess. 1-3 (1935).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). This awareness of the possibility of obstruction to commerce is expressed in § I of the NLRA:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id The obstruction to the free flow of commerce due to the lack of collective bargaining
derives from:
(a) [an] impairing [of] the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities
of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting,
restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed
goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or
goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such
volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or
into the channels of commerce.
Id; see First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1981) ("A fundamental
aim of the [NLRA] is the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the
flow of interstate commerce. Central to achievement of this purpose is the promotion of
collective bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict between labor and
management.") (citation and footnote omitted); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 499
(1979) (collective bargaining is preferable to allowing disputes outside the negotiation process to lead to stress); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1952) (enforcement of the obligation to bargain collectively is of prime importance); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (the NLRA "goes no further than to safeguard
the right of employees to self-organization . . . for collective bargaining . . . without restraint or coercion"). Collective bargaining is also carried out free from government intervention as to the actual terms and conditions of employment. See Howard Johnson Co. v.
Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 254 (1974) (quoting NLRB v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 406
U.S. 272, 287 (1972), quoting H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970))
("[F]reedom of collective bargaining-'private bargaining under governmental supervision
of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract'-[is] a 'fundamental premise' of the federal labor laws .... ").

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 33:943

To avoid this undesirable end, section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires the
employer to bargain collectively with the employees' representatives.12 In
addition, this section of the Act prohibits either party from unilaterally
collective bargaining agreement outside certerminating or modifying the
3
tain specified procedures.'
The respective policies of the NLRA and the Code, therefore, collide
when the trustee or debtor in possession requests permission to reject a
12. Section 8(a)(5) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
It should be noted that a debtor in possession is an employer within the meaning of the
NLRA. Section 2 of the NLRA defines the term "employer" to include "any person acting
as an agent of an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (emphasis added). A trustee in
bankruptcy is considered to be a "person" within the meaning of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(1) (1982). Thus, the trustee or debtor in possession falls within the application of the
term "employer" in § 8(a)(5). Because § 8(d) defines the duty to bargain under § 8(a)(5), a
debtor in possession who terminates or modifies a contract outside of the procedures prescribed in § 8(d), infra note 13, also violates § 8(a)(5). See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S.
282, 285 (1957). A unilateral modification of the contract, therefore, would constitute a violation of § 8(d) and § 8(a)(5). See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 159, 185 (1971).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The proviso of § 158(d) further defines the collective
bargaining obligation:
[W]here there is in effect a collective bargaining contract covering employees in
an industry affecting commerce . . . no party to such contract shall terminate or
modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification (I)
serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof . . . ; (2)
offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new
contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications; (3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service . . . ; and (4) continues in full force and
effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the
existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the
expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later. The duties imposed upon
employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2) to (4) . . . shall
not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of
the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened
under the provisions of the contract.
1d (emphasis added). It has been recognized that the purpose of § 8(d) extends beyond
mere promotion of contract compliance. "The conditions for a modification or termination
set out in paragraphs (1) through (4) plainly are designed to regulate modifications and
terminations so as to facilitate agreement in place of economic warfare." Allied Chem. &
Alkali Workers, Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187 (1971); see H.R.
REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947).
It should also be recognized that, in spite of the defined, protracted modification procedure of § 8(d), this section is construed flexibly in light of all the provisions of the NLRA, its
object, and policy. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956).
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collective bargaining agreement as an executory contract under section
365(a) of the Code. Allowing the debtor in possession to reject the collective bargaining agreement would result in a unilateral termination of the
contract in violation of the NLRA section 8(d) termination and modification procedures. 14 Requiring the debtor in possession to comply with all
the statutory requirements of section 8(d) is equally objectionable because
it would hinder the Code's goal of providing the debtor with a flexible and
unfettered opportunity to revitalize the failing business. 5
Due to the lack of a clear legislative mandate in either the Code or the
NLRA, the judiciary was faced with the task of accommodating the competing interests and policies. 16 The courts generally held that a collective
14. See supra note 13. Further, § 2 of the NLRA defines the term "person" under the
NLRA as including "trustees in cases under title 11." 29 U.S.C. § 152(1) (1982). Thus,
Congress has revealed a specific intent to bind a trustee or debtor in possession to the requirements of the NLRA.
15. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (purpose of a reorganization is to grant the debtor "a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort"); accord Harris v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust
Co., 317 U.S. 447, 451 (1943); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918). The root principle of § 365(a) is that "a trustee in bankruptcy [should have the authority to] renounce title

to and abandon burdensome property." 2

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

365.01 (15th ed.

1983).
16. The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation case, is to
restructure a business' finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The
premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in
the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap. . . . If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it often can
be returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganizethan to
liquidate, because it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6179 (emphasis added).
For the policies underlying the NLRA, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; see
also John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960)) ("[A] collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract. '[It is a generalized code to govern a myriad of
cases which the draftsmen [could not] wholly anticipate . . . . The collective agreement
covers the whole employment relationship.' "). Livingston and Warrior & Gulf "distinguished a labor agreement from other forms of agreements and established a new common
law insofar as labor contracts were concerned." La Penna, Bankruptcy & the Bankruptcy
Act, N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB., 169, 175 (1976).
It should be noted that the legislative history of the Adjustment of Debts of Political
Subdivisions and Public Agencies and Instrumentalities specifically addressed the issue of
rejection of labor contracts. Section 402(b)(1) permitted the court to allow the "[agency,
instrumentality, or political subdivision] to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases
of the petitioner, after hearing on notice to the parties to such contracts [and] leases .... "
11 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (1976) (footnote omitted) (codified as amended at II U.S.C. § 365(a)
(1982)). The House Report concerning the standard for the rejection of ordinary, executory
contracts required a showing that the contract is "onerous and burdensome, and its rejection
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bargaining agreement, with the court's approval, could be rejected as an
executory contract under section 365(a) of the Code. 7 The inquiry focused on the proper characterization of the post-petition debtor, its consequent obligations under the NLRA, and the proper standard to be used to
permit rejection of the agreement. The courts of appeals developed divergent characterizations of the debtor in possession, labeling it either as the
same prebankruptcy company 18 or as a "new entity.' 9 Further, three
standards for rejecting the agreement emerged:
(1) the balancing of the equities test 2° that involved a two-step analysis:
first, the contract must be shown to be "onerous and burdensome," and
second, the equities of the situation must tip decidedly in favor of
will aid the petitioner in its reorganization and rehabilitation attempt." H.R. REP. No. 686,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1975), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 539, 55455. This language is very similar to the standard announced in Kevin Steel, infra notes 87100 and accompanying text, for the rejection of labor contracts. See infra note 105 and
accompanying text. Further, the report noted that "[w]ith respect to labor contracts, the
courts have taken a slightly different position on the grounds for rejection, requiring a showing of greater burden on the petitioner." H.R. REP. No. 686 at 17. The report cited Kevin
Steel and REA Express, infra notes 101- 18 and accompanying text, for this proposition. Id
See infra notes 87-121 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 894 (1Ilth Cir. 1983);
Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210, 214 (9th Cir. 1980); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 166 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Shopmen's Local No. 455 v.
Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1975).
The legislative history of § 365(a) recognizes that although "there is no precise definition
of what contracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347
(1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6303. One widely accepted
definition includes a "contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other."
Countryman, Executory Contractsin Bankruptcy.- Part , 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
One should also note the difference between § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982), and the parallel provision of the Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575,
§ 313, 52 Stat. 840, 906 (1938) (codified as amended at II U.S.C. § 713 (1976)). The latter
section provided that "[ulpon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties conferred and imposed upon it by this chapter, (1) permit the
rejection of executory contracts of the debtor ...
" II U.S.C. § 713 (1976) (amended by 11
U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982)) (emphasis added). The Code now requires the court's approval for
both the assumption and rejection of an executory contract. See supra note 7; 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 365.03, at 365-13 (15th ed. 1983); see also In re Summit Land Co., 13 Bankr.
310, 314 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (rejection of executory contract cannot occur without bankruptcy court approval).
18. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
20. This test was originally set forth in Shopmen's Local No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod.,
Inc., 519 F.2d at 707. See infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
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termination;2 i
(2) a heightened standard of review test 2 2 that required the contract to
be so onerous and burdensome that its nonrejection would effectively preclude a successful reorganization; 23 and
(3) the business judgment rule that permitted rejection of the agreement
24
when it would improve the financial condition of the debtor.

In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 2s the United States Supreme Court addressed two issues: (1) under what conditions can a bankruptcy court permit rejection of a collective bargaining agreement; and (2) may the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) 26 find a debtor in pos21. See In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 899 (1lth Cir. 1983);
Shopmen's Local No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Blue
Ribbon Transp., 30 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re J.R. Elkins, Inc., 27 Bankr. 862
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983). See infra notes 87-100, 122-42 and accompanying text.
22. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164
(2d Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1073 (1976). The Second
Circuit decided REA Express only one month after Kevin Steel. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23. See REA Express, 523 F.2d at 169; In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Truck Co., 24 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re David
Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. 190 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Connecticut Celery Co., 106
L.R.R.M. 2847 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Allied Technology, Inc., 8 Bankr. 366 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 6 Bankr. 968 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980).
24. See Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal.
1976), afjd, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); In re Ateco
Equip., Inc., 18 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
In Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision that adopted the business judgment rule.
613 F.2d at 218. The court, however, expressly refused to address the issue of the proper
standard for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. Id at 213 n.2. Nevertheless, the
fact that the Ninth Circuit made no attempt to balance the employee concerns vis-a-vis the
objective of a successful reorganization in concluding that rejection was appropriate could
reflect an unannounced use of the business judgment rule. See Comment, Bankruptcy LawLabor Law. Rejection, Assumption and Modification of Collective Bargaining Agreements,
1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 311, 321.
25. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984). Two cases were consolidated for argument: the first was
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco; the second was Teamsters Local 408 v. NLRB. Both cases
were reported below at 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
26. The NLRB was created pursuant to § 3 of the NLRA in 1935. 29 U.S.C. § 153
(1982). "It is the business of the Board to give coordinated effect to the policies of the
[National Labor Relations Act]." NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348
(1953). Further, "[tihe function of striking [the] balance to effectuate national labor policy is
often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the
[NLRB], subject to limitedjudicial review." NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers,
434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)) (emphasis
added); see NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1974). Deference is thus given to
the NLRB based upon its expertise in the field of labor relations. It should be noted that the
NLRB has ruled that a debtor in possession violates § 8(d) and § 8(a)(5) by unilaterally
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session guilty of committing an unfair labor practice for unilaterally terminating or modifying the labor contract during the period following the
filing of the bankruptcy petition and before rejection of the agreement has
been approved by the bankruptcy court. The Court held that, before a
bankruptcy court acts on a petition to reject a collective bargaining agreement, it should be persuaded that reasonable yet prospectively unsuccess27
ful efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made.
Having established this fact, the majority stated that the bankruptcy court
should permit rejection of the agreement upon a proper showing by the
debtor that the agreement burdens the estate and that the equities tip in
favor of rejection.2" The Court further held that a debtor does not commit
an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA when it unilaterally terminates or modifies the agreement before receiving the bankruptcy court's
29
permission to reject it.
In April, 1980, Bildisco, a New Jersey partnership, filed a voluntary petition for reorganization under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.3" The
bankruptcy court designated Bildisco as a debtor in possession and authorized it to operate the business. In January 1981, the debtor in possession
sought permission from the bankruptcy court to reject its collective bargaining agreement with Local 408 of the Teamsters, pursuant to section
365(a) of the Code.3 Without articulating a standard for rejection, the
bankruptcy court promptly approved the rejection of the agreement retroactive to the date immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition." The union appealed to the district court which affirmed the
altering the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. See ISG Extrusion Tooling, Inc.,
262 N.L.R.B. 114, 116 (1982); Airport Limousine Serv., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 932, 935 (1977).
But see Blazer Indus., 236 N.L.R.B. 103, 109-10 (1978) (trustee in bankruptcy held not

bound to the preexisting collective bargaining agreement when there were significant
changes in the operations of the debtor immediately after the bankruptcy petition was filed).
27. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
28. Id
29. Id. at 1200.
30. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 75. See II U.S.C. §§ 1101-46 (1982).
31. 682 F.2d at 75; see supra note 7. At the rejection hearing, a Bildisco partner stated
that the company would be able to save approximately $100,000 in 1981 by abrogating the
collective bargaining agreement. 682 F.2d at 75.

32. 682 F.2d at 75. Section 365(g)(I) provides in part that "the rejection of an executory
contract

. . .

of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract

. .

. (1) if such contract

...

has not been assumed under this section or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, or
13 of this title, immediately before the date of the filing of the petition ....

." 11 U.S.C.

§ 365(g)(1) (1982) (emphasis added). The Senate Report explains that the purpose of the
"relation back" of the time constituting the breach of the contract "is to treat rejection
claims as prepetition claims." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1978). Allowance
for these claims is provided under the rules for prepetition claims. See I I U.S.C. § 502(f),
(g) (1982). Priority for these § 502 claims is determined under the rules for prepetition
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bankruptcy court's order.3 3 Thereupon, the union appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.34
In mid-summer 1980, the union filed unfair labor practice charges with
the NLRB complaining that Bildisco had violated certain provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement.35 In July 1980, the General Counsel of
the NLRB issued a complaint alleging that Bildisco had engaged in unfair
labor practices in violation of sections 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA by
making unilateral changes in the collective bargaining agreement.36
Bildisco failed to respond to the NLRB's repeated efforts to have the company file its answers to the complaint. In January, 1981, the NLRB moved
for summary judgment based upon Bildisco's failure to answer the complaint.37 One month later, Bildisco stated that its delay in filing an answer
had been caused by its chapter 11 proceedings. It also informed the
Board's General Counsel of the bankruptcy court's rejection of the collective bargaining agreement and argued that the retroactive effect of such
rejection terminated the contract after April 14, 1980.38 On April 23, 1981,
the NLRB granted the General Counsel's motion for summary judgment,
claims. See II U.S.C. § 507 (1982). The Senate Report covering § 507(a)(2), which grants
second priority to § 502(f) prepetition unsecured claims, refers to individuals within this
category as "involuntary gap" creditors. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1978).
This second priority covers "claims arising in the ordinary course of the debtor's business or
financial affairs after a title 11 case has begun but before the order for relief .
Id.
I..."
Despite this relation back notion, many courts deem the executory contracts to remain in
effect after the bankruptcy petition has been filed and until they are rejected by the party
with court approval. See, e.g., Federal's Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 575, 579 (6th
Cir. 1977); Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d 539, 542 n.6 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Guardian Equip. Corp.,
18 Bankr. 864, 867 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). This reveals judicial belief that the relation back
of the rejection does no more than to create prepetition claims and does not affect the enforceability of the contract.
33. 682 F.2d at 75. In a bench opinion, the district court noted that under the Bankruptcy Act, judicial evaluation of petitions to reject commercial contracts utilized a "business judgment" standard whereas the test for labor contracts was more rigorous. The district
court determined that the contract would have been rejected under either standard and thus
it was not necessary to rule on the appropriate test. Id.
34. Id at 76. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
35. The union claimed Bildisco failed to grant wage increases called for by the collective bargaining agreement. In addition, vacation pay was withheld. Further, Bildisco
ceased making required pension and welfare contributions to the appropriate trust funds,
and failed to forward to the union the dues the company was withholding from the employees' paychecks. 682 F.2d at 75-76.
36. Id. Section 8(a) of the NLRA provides in part: "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1)to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7; . . .(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1982); see supra note 13 for a
definition of the collective bargaining obligation.
37. 682 F.2d at 76.
38. Id See supra note 32.
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stating that Bildisco had not shown good cause for its failure to answer the
complaint. 39 The Board made a "finding of fact" that the debtor in possession was the alter ego in bankruptcy to Bildisco. 4 ' Therefore, the NLRB
ordered Bildisco, as debtor in possession, to honor the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Further, the Board petitioned the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for enforcement of its
order. 4 '
The court of appeals consolidated the union's appeal and the NLRB's
petition for enforcement of its order. The court examined the policies of
the Code and the NLRA.42 It determined that section 365 permits rejection of collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts. 43 The circuit court also rejected the alter ego theory propounded by the NLRB 44
and emphasized that the debtor in possession, in contrast to a prebankruptcy debtor, is not a party to the contract. 45 It stated that the authority of the debtor in possession unilaterally to institute a midterm
modification or termination of the collective bargaining agreement is not,
therefore, limited by the restrictions of section 8(d) of the NLRA 46 because
the debtor in possession is not a party to any labor agreement. 47 Further,
because the rejection of a contract relates back to the date of the filing of
39. 682 F.2d at 76.
40. Id. Alter ego status exists when there is a finding that the two enterprises have

"substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers,
and supervision as well as ownership." Crawford Door Sales, 226 N.L.R.B. 1144 (1976); see
also Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 259 n.5 (1979) ("a mere technical change in the structure or identity of the employing entity, frequently to avoid the effect
of the labor laws, without any substantial change in its ownership or management" is to be
of no legal consequence and such an alter ego is subject to all the legal and contractual
obligations of the predecessor). The difference between a determination of "alter ego" and
"successor employer" status is that the alter ego is required to assume its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Marquis Printing Corp. and Mutual Lithograph Co.,
213 N.L.R.B. 394 (1974). With successor status, one is required only to recognize and bargain with the exclusive representatives of the employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec.
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
41. 682 F.2d at 76.
42. Id.at 78.
43. Id. at 79. Under § 365(g), the rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach
of such contract immediately before the date of the filing of the chapter I I petition. II
U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982); see supra note 32. The union will, therefore, have a right to damages
resulting from this breach. See La Penna, supranote 16, at 180-83 (1976). For a discussion
of the priority of union claims against the debtor, see infra note 138.
44. The court "suggest[ed] to the NLRB that, at least in matters within [the Third Circuit], it cease operating under such a fundamental misconception of the law." 682 F.2d at
83.
45. Id at 78-79.
46. See supra note 13.
47. 682 F.2d at 79.
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the bankruptcy petition, 48 the court reasoned that if Bildisco were permitted to reject the contract, the NLRB would be precluded from finding the
debtor guilty of an unfair labor practice based on a unilateral modification
of the agreement.4 9
The court then examined the standard to be applied in allowing the rejection of a labor contract. It concluded that the "balancing of the equities" approach provided the correct formulation of the appropriate
accommodation between the competing statutory policies.5 ° The court expressly rejected the more stringent test that permits rejection only when it
is necessary to save the debtor company from collapse. 5' Because the
lower courts had approved rejection without articulating a standard, the
court vacated the district court decision and remanded to the bankruptcy
court for reconsideration.5 2 The NLRB's application for enforcement of
its order requiring that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement be
honored also was denied.53
48. See supra note 32.
49. 682 F.2d at 83.
50. Id. at 79. The court believed that the
debtor-in-possession must first demonstrate that the continuation of the collective
bargaining agreement would be burdensome to the estate; that once this threshold
determination has been made the debtor-in-possession must make a factual presentation sufficient to permit the bankruptcy court to weigh the competing equities;
that the polestar is to do equity between claims which arise under the labor contract and other claims against the debtor; that, in this, the court must consider the
rights of covered employees as supported by the national labor policy as well as the
possible 'sacrifices which other creditors are making' in the effort to bring about a
successful reorganization ....
Id at 81 (quoting Group of Inst. Inv. v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550
(1943)).
51. Id at 79. The court rejected the
formulations of [certain] decisions. . . which purport to follow the. .. 'balancing
of the equities' [test] but instead replace [that standard] with a test predicating permission to reject on a showing 'that an onerous and burdensome executory collective bargaining agreement will thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in bankruptcy
from collapse.'
Id. (quoting Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164,
169 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1073 (1976)); see supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit enunciated two reasons for not following this strict test:
first, for the pragmatic reason that it may be impossible to predict the success vel
non of a reorganization until very late in the arrangement proceedings; and second,
for the prudential consideration that. . . imposition of [the REA Express] test unduly exalts the perpetuation of the collective bargaining agreement over the more
pragmatic consideration of whether the employees will continue to have jobs at all.
682 F.2d at 80.
52. 682 F.2d at 84-85.
53. Id. at 85.
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The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that after a sufficient showing that
reasonable, yet unsuccessful, efforts have been made to negotiate a contract modification, a bankruptcy court may permit a debtor in possession
to reject its collective bargaining agreement with a union.54 The Court
unanimously ruled that the standard to be utilized by the bankruptcy court
in determining whether rejection of the labor contract should be permitted
requires a showing that the agreement burdens the estate and that the equities balance in favor of rejection.55 It maintained that because of the
special nature of a collective bargaining agreement and the consequent
"law of the shop" that the agreement creates, a standard stricter than the
"business judgment" test,56 utilized to permit rejection of ordinary, executory contracts, should be applied by the bankruptcy court in ruling on a
petition to reject a labor contract.5 7 The Court, however, repudiated the
application of a test that would make rejection contingent upon the
debtor's demonstration that, absent rejection, the company would be
forced into liquidation.5" It reasoned that the application of such a very
strict test would be contrary to the flexibility and equity inherent in the
Code. 59

A sharply divided Court further held that a debtor's unilateral termination or modification of the collective bargaining agreement, prior to formal
approval of contract rejection by the bankruptcy court, does not constitute
a violation of section 8(d) of the NLRA.6 ° It asserted that the authority to
reject is vital to the basic purpose of a chapter 11 reorganization because
rejection will release the debtor in possession from burdensome contracts
that may impede a successful reorganization. 6 ' Five justices further reasoned that, because the collective bargaining agreement is not an enforceable contract from the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition to formal
acceptance of the contract, the debtor in possession is not bound by the
requirements of section 8(d).6 2
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's
holding that a debtor in possession does not commit an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally alters the terms of a labor contract post-petition
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

104 S. Ct. at 1196-97.
Id at 1196.
See infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
104 S. Ct. at 1195.
Id at 1195-96.
Id at 1196.
Id at 1200.
Id at 1198.
Id. at 1198-1200.
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yet prior to receiving bankruptcy court permission to reject the contract.63
He asserted that the majority misinterpreted the policies and provisions of
the Code and the NLRA for it was Congress' intent that a debtor in possession adhere to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement in the
post-petition period.64
Legislation was introduced in Congress the day the Court handed down
Bildisco to counter the potentially harmful impact of the Court's ruling.6 5
The recently enacted Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984 (Bankruptcy Amendments Act) represents the culmination of this
legislative drive to alter certain aspects of the Bildisco scheme relating to
the standard and procedure for the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement in a reorganization case.6 6 Under the Bankruptcy Amendments
Act, after filing a petition for bankruptcy, yet prior to filing an application
for rejection of a union contract, the debtor in possession or trustee must
63. Id at 1211.
64. Id
65. On February 22, 1984, Representative Peter Rodino introduced a bill that would
require the debtor in possession to petition the bankruptcy court for authorization to terminate or modify the labor contract. Further, the bankruptcy court could permit rejection only
if it found that the jobs covered in the collective bargaining agreement would be lost and the
financial reorganization of the debtor would fail unless rejection were permitted. Finally,
Rodino's bill unequivocally denied the trustee the authorization to unilaterally terminate or
modify the collective bargaining agreement. H.R. 4908, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 130 CONG.
REC., H780-81 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1984) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
66. The complete text of subtitle J reads as follows:
Sec. 541. (a) Title 11 of the United States Code is amended by adding after
section 1112 the following new section:
§ 1113. Rejection of collective bargaining agreements
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under the
provisions of this chapter, other than a trustee in a case covered by subchapter IV
of this chapter and by title I of the Railway Labor Act, may assume or reject a
collective bargaining agreement only in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee
(hereinafter in this section 'trustee' shall include a debtor in possession), shall(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees covered
by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information available
at the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifications in
the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected
parties are treated fairly and equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees with
such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided for in
subsection (d)(l), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized
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representative to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory
modifications of such agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement only if the court finds that(]) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsection (b)(l);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such
proposal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
(d)(l) Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall schedule a
hearing to be held not later than fourteen days after the date of the filing of such
application. All interested parties may appear and be heard at such hearing. Adequate notice shall be provided to such parties at least ten days before the date of
such hearing. The court may extend the time for the commencement of such hearing for a period not exceeding seven days where the circumstances of the case, and
the interests of justice require such extension, or for additional periods of time to
which the trustee and representative agree.
(2) The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty days after
the date of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests of justice, the court
may extend such time for ruling for such additional period as the trustee and the
employees' representative may agree to. If the court does not rule on such application within thirty days after the date of the commencement of the hearing, or
within such additional time as the trustee and the employees' representative may
agree to, the trustee may terminate or alter any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the ruling of the court on such application.
(3) The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the need of the
authorized representative of the employee to evaluate the trustee's proposal and
the application for rejection, as may be necessary to prevent disclosure of information provided to such representative where such disclosure could compromise the
position of the debtor with respect to its competitors in the industry in which it is
engaged.
(e) If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in
effect, and if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to
avoid irreparable damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may
authorize the trustee to implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages,
benefits, or work rules provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the
trustee. The implementation of such interim changes shall not render the application for rejection moot.
(f) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally
terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to
compliance with the provisions of this section.
(b) The table of sections for chapter II of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1112 the following new
item:
1113. Rejection of collective bargaining agreements.
(c) The amendments made by this section shall become effective upon the date of
enactment of this Act; provided that this section shall not apply to cases filed under
title II of the United States Code which were commenced prior to the date of
enactment of this section.
H.R. REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-63, reprintedin Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 98
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make a contract modification proposal to the employees' representative. 67
The proposed modifications may not extend beyond those alterations necessary to the successful reorganization of the debtor.68 Further, the proposal must contain assurances that all creditors, the debtor, and other
affected parties are being treated fairly and equitably. 69 Thus, the statute
Stat. 333, 390-91. The Bankruptcy Amendments Act was enacted on June 29, 1984 and
signed into law by the President on July 10, 1984. See Bankruptcy Amendments, 1984 U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 98 Stat. 333, 392. Congressional commentary on the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act reveals that the purpose for the labor legislation was to overturn that part
of Bildisco permitting unilateral contract changes prior to a judicial hearing. See 130 CONG.
REC. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood); id at S8890 (statement
of Sen. Dole); id. at H7491 (statement of Rep. Moorhead); id at H7494 (statement of Rep.
Glickman); infra notes 179-93.
67. Bankruptcy Amendments Act, supra note 66. Further, the debtor must provide the
union representative with such information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal. See id.
at § 1l13(b)(l)(B).
68. Id The key phrase is "necessary modifications." The debtor in possession, therefore, "must limit his proposal to modify a collective bargaining agreement to only those
modifications that must be accomplished if the reorganization is to succeed." 130 CONG.
REC. H7496 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Morrison); see id. at H7490 (statement of Rep. Fish); id. at S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Packwood further
viewed the "necessary modification" language as a provision that will preclude the debtors
from exploiting the bankruptcy procedure as a means to rid itself of undesired features of a
collective bargaining agreement that have no relation to the successful reorganization of the
company. The "necessary" prerequisite therefore, "guarantees the sincerity of the debtor's
good faith in seeking contract changes." Id at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
69. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 13(b)(l)(A), supra note 66. The phrase "affected parties" probably will be construed broadly. It may "include those parties with a
contractual, legal, or financial tie to the debtor that would make it one of the logical parties
to the equities balancing that must proceed as the court administers a reorganization." 130
CONG. REC. S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch). Nevertheless, it is "not meant to include any
party which might conceivably be affected in any minor way, but is intended to encompass
those parties directly affected." Id. at S8888 (statement of Sen. Thurmond). The interests of
all nonunion employees, therefore, should be considered. Id The object of the "fair and
equitable treatment" requirement is to prevent the focus for cost cutting from being directed
exclusively at the union employees. Rather, the burden is to be spread among all "affected
parties." "[E]xperience shows that when workers know that they alone are not bearing the
sole brunt of the sacrifices, they will agree to shoulder their fair share and in some instances
without the necessity for a formal contract rejection." 130 CONG. REC. at S8898 (statement
of Sen. Packwood). Further, the fair and equitable treatment language was intended to
assure that "the type of balancing of all the equities that takes place when the court finally
rules on rejection also takes place during [the] preliminary negotiations." Id at S8892
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
With respect to the actual accounting, the conference committee was aware of the practical difficulties involved in identifying all the interested parties and their respective interests
at this early stage of the reorganization. Thus, the mandated proposal by the business to the
union representative is not to be construed as requiring a detailed accounting of how the
reorganization burden is to be distributed among the affected parties. See id.
In his commentary on the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, Senator Packwood referred to a
particular bankruptcy court decision as an example of the application of the fair and equita-
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initially demands good faith negotiations between the parties as a prerequisite to obtaining judicial relief from a burdensome labor contract.7 °
Once an application for rejection of a labor contract has been made, and
therefore necessarily after a modification proposal has been profferred and
good faith negotiations have occurred, 7 the court7 2 must schedule a hearing within fourteen days after the filing of the rejection petition." The
court is thereafter required to rule on the rejection application within
thirty days after commencement of the hearing; 4 nevertheless, this time
period may be extended by the court as justice requires and as the employees' representative and the debtor in possession agree.75 Further, the court
may approve an application for rejection only where the following elements are found:
76
(1) the trustee has negotiated with the parties;
(2) the union representative has refused to accept the trustee's proposal
"without good cause";77 and
ble treatment requirement. Id at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood). In In re Blue Ribbon Transp. Co., 113 L.R.R.M. 3505 (D. R.I. 1983), the court found that the labor
agreement should be rejected because, absent rejection, the company would be forced to
shut down. The court, however, refused to permit rejection unless the company showed that
it reduced management salaries, disposed of the majority of company cars, cancelled gasoline credit cards, and reduced health and pension contributions for management proportionately with union benefit contributions. See 113 L.R.R.M. at 3507-09.
70. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 13(b)(2), supra note 66.
71. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
72. Although not explicitly stated in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, it has been suggested that because "an application to reject a collective bargaining agreement implicates
national labor policy, as well as bankruptcy policy, if the union or trustee [move to reject the
labor contract], such an application is to be heard by a United States district judge." 130
CONG. REC. at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
73. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 13(d)(l), supra note 66. The court, however,
may extend the time for commencement of the hearing for a maximum of seven days as
justice requires or as the trustee and union representative agree. Id
74. Id at § I113(d)(2), supra note 66.
75. The statute does not place a uniform ceiling on the extension of time for the court to
rule on the rejection application. This decision is left to the discretion of the parties. Id
76. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. One should note, however, that a
troubled business may not be able to reorganize without a complete rejection of the labor
agreement. "Complete rejection may, in cases of severe financial distress, be the only proposal that a business may make to effect reorganization. The good faith nature of these negotiations will require that the employees' union representative be given an opportunity to
review and accept or reject the business proposal." 130 CONG. REC. at S8892 (statement of
Sen. Hatch). Thus, it is recognized that a proposal offering only complete rejection of the
contract may be statutorily acceptable.
77. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 13(c)(2), supranote 66. The phrase "without
good cause" is undefined. The language was included, however, to ensure that a process of
good faith negotiation occurs prior to judicial intervention. See 130 CONG. REC. at 7496
(statement of Rep. Morrison). The requirement acts as an incentive for the debtor to negoti-
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(3) the equities balance clearly in favor of rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.7" Thus, the Bankruptcy Amendments Act provides a
structured yet flexible time frame within which the rejection must be ruled
upon. The statute, however, inflexibly demands the existence of all three
prerequisites before rejection of the contract may be approved.
In order to ensure the successful reorganization of the debtor, the Bankruptcy Amendments Act includes several emergency relief provisions. The
amendments provide that the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize interim modifications in the collective bargaining agreement if essential to the continuation of the business or in order to avoid irreparable
damage to the debtor company.7 9 Further, should the court not rule on
ate in good faith. The statute, therefore, will not stand as a "barrier to rejection if the
debtor's proposal has contained only the specified 'necessary' modifications." Id at S8898
(statement of Sen. Packwood). Thus, the language serves the two-fold purpose of protecting
the union from bad faith proposals and shielding the employer from a union's unjustifiable
rejection of a reasonable offer. See generally Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 299, 300,
319 (1983) (suggesting that rejection should be permitted only in the extraordinary cases,
when the union has unjustifiably refused to agree to a contract modification necessary to
ensure the success of the reorganization).
A ruling on the "without good cause" requirement will be very fact-specific and should be
judged in light of the purpose of the language-to promote good faith negotiations. The
conferees believed that the language should be interpreted narrowly by a reviewing court.
"[Ijt certainly was not intended to permit virtually any refusal on the part of the labor representative. 130 CONG. REC. at H7495 (statement of Rep. Lungren). It has been suggested
that the ruling on this requirement should be based on facts derived directly from the contract between the parties. Id A balancing test has been proposed. "[R]ejection of a proposal should only happen if the cause for rejection is good enough to risk the damage to the
business as well as its creditors and employees that delay on protracted negotiations could
produce." Id.at S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch). It has further been suggested that the
good cause requirement is not intended to encompass traditional labor law concepts; the
bankruptcy courts are not to be transformed into another NLRB. See id at S8888 (statement of Sen. Thurmond). But see id.at S8900 (statement of Sen. Moynihan) ("the legislation. . . embodies the principles of the NLRA by requiring the company to bargain in good
faith."). In sum, the provision should be applied in a "workable manner." Id.at S8888
(statement of Sen. Thurmond).
78. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 13(c)(3), supra note 66. The legislative history reveals that the Bildisco balancing of the equities test is the standard that will be applied. See 103 CONG. REC. at H7495 (statement of Rep. Lungren); id at H7490 (statement
of Rep. Fish); id.
at S8890 (statement of Sen. Dole); id at S8900 (statement of Sen. Moynihan); id.at S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch). "The word 'clearly' is merely intended to
assure that rejection is not warranted where the equities balance exactly equal on each side."
Id at S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch). It seems more likely, however, that in each case the
equities will balance in favor of one alternative or the other. See id
79. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 1113(e), supra note 66. The purpose of granting
interim modifications is to "prevent draining estates beyond repair." 130 CONG. REC. at
H7490 (statement of Rep. Fish). Such a motion for interim relief may only be made in
conjunction with an application to reject the collective bargaining agreement. If interim
modifications are granted, however, they are effective only for the period of consideration
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the application to reject the contract within thirty days of the commencement of the rejection hearing, s° the trustee or debtor in possession may
unilaterally terminate or alter any provision of the collective bargaining
agreement pending the court's ruling on the application to reject. 8 ' These
and ruling on the application to reject the labor contract. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act
§ 11 13(d)(l), (d)(2), (d)(3), (e); 130 CONG. REC. at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
Further, the court, "[iun deference to the overall policy of the provision which is to encourage the parties to reach their own agreement through collective bargaining. . . in framing [the interim relief] may not go beyond the proposal made by the trustee pursuant to
subsection (b)(l)(A)." 130 CONG. REC. at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison); see supra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text. There is debate, however, concerning whether the statute requires the applicaton of the strict REA Express standard in ruling on a motion for
interim relief. Compare 130 CONG. REC. at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison) ("The statutory language of subsection (e) stating the standard for qualifying for interim relief is, in
essence, the REA Express standard.") and id at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood) (the
interim modification provision requires the application of the REA Express standard) with
id at H7496 (statement of Rep. Lungren) (favoring an "extremely narrow" standard yet not
accepting the REA Express formulation because one should not subordinate the debtor's
reorganization to the union contract, thus risking the employees jobs, by so strictly interpreting the § 11 13(e) standard); see infra notes 101-18 and accompanying text. Finally, although
not expressly provided in the Bankruptcy Amendments, it has been stated that if the application for rejection of the contract is denied, the employees are entitled to their wages and
benefits lost under an interim order as an administrative expense. See 130 CONG. REC. at
H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison); infra note 138.
80. The Bankruptcy Amendments require the court to rule on the rejection application
within 30 days of the commencement of the rejection hearing. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 13(d)(2), supranotes 66, 74 and accompanying text. In the interests ofjustice,
however, this time period may be extended. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 13(d)(2),
supra note 66.
81. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act, § 1113(d)(2), supra note 66. Legislative commentary on this emergency relief mechanism varied. It has been stated that this provision,
requiring a prior hearing and the subsequent expiration of an established time limit before
the debtor in possession could unilaterally alter the labor agreement, overruled Bildisco with
respect to the unfair labor practice issue. See 103 CONG. REC. at S8890 (statement of Sen.
Dole); id at 58898 (statement of Sen. Packwood); see infra notes 179-93 and accompanying
text. It is believed that the contract is statutorily deemed "enforceable" during the postbankruptcy petition period. See 130 CONG. REC. at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood)
(commenting that the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, which requires a hearing prior to permitting a unilateral modification by the debtor, establishes that the contract is enforceable
and binding on both parties until a court-approved rejection); see infra notes 179-93 and
accompanying text. Commentary focusing on this interpretation of the emergency provision
not surprisingly stressed the limited nature and secondary consequences expected from the
30-day exception. See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. at S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood). In the
event the court subsequently refuses to permit rejection of the contract, the trustee must pay
back any wages and benefits withheld unilaterally. Id Moreover, if the debtor unilaterally
alters the contract, the union is "free to engage in strike activity since its no-strike obligation
would no longer be binding." Id.
Legislative explication has also noted the practical significance of the emergency, unilateral modification provision:
should a judge fail to rule on an application for rejection within 30 days of the
commencement of the hearing on such application, the debtor may unilaterally
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provisions represent congressional awareness of the practical necessity of
providing the debtor with the needed flexibility to avoid being forced into
82
liquidation during the reorganization process.
In order to adequately understand and properly apply the standards and
procedures affecting collective bargaining agreements embodied in the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act, one must possess an understanding of
Bildisco and prior case law. This Note, therefore, will compare the statutory frameworks of the Code and the NLRA and will examine the varied
judicial interpretations of the conflicting policies of these two statutes.
Particular emphasis will be placed on an examination of the three standards that have been applied to reject a collective bargaining agreement in
bankruptcy. Further, this Note will discuss Bildisco and the subsequent
legislative modifications with respect to the standard the court will apply
to rule on a rejection application and the ability of the debtor in possession
to unilaterally alter the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. An
analysis of Bildisco and the Bankruptcy Amendments Act will reveal that,
although Congress has moderated Bildisco's tendentious conclusion favoring the reorganizing debtor, it might not have altered the practical conse83
quences of the rejection process.
terminate or alter any of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements
pending the court's final ruling on the application. At thatpoint in time, the debtor
would essentialy be in the sameposition he is now in under the Bildisco decision-that
is he may unilateral4y abrogatethe contract pending the court's decision.
130 CONG. REC. at S8888 (statement of Sen. Thurmond) (emphasis added). The implication

from this language is that the emergency exception may have a significant impact. Thus, it
would not be accurate to state that Bildisco's holding with respect to a debtor's post-petition
unilateral termination or modification of the labor contract was completely overruled by the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act. See infra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
Finally, it should be noted that, in the event the court fails to rule on the rejection application within the prescribed time limit, "expeditious mandamus relief would be available in
the appellate courts." 130 CONG. REC. at H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
82. See 130 CONG. REC. at S8888 (statement of Sen. Thurmond). It should be noted

that the Bankruptcy Amendments are prospective in application. The amendments do not
apply to cases filed prior to the date of their enactment. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act
§ 541(c), supra note 66. Cases pending prior to the date of the enactment of the amendments, June 29, 1984, therefore will follow the Bildisco holding.
83. In addition to the statutory conflict that must be resolved, there are other practical
considerations that reveal the significance of the Supreme Court decision and the legislation.
Over the past several years, there has been a marked increase in chapter I filings. During
the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1982, 12,385 chapter II proceedings were initiated.
See Table F3A, Admin. Office, U.S. Courts Statistical Analyses and Reports Div. (June 30,
1982). For the same period ending June 30, 1983, 18,306 chapter I I proceedings were commenced. See Table F3A, Admin. Office, U.S. Courts Statistical Analyses and Reports Div.
(June 30, 1983). This represents almost a 48% increase and reveals a trend of increased
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A SPECTRUM OF STANDARDS

As previously stated, prior to enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments
Act, the Code placed no express limitation on the power of the bankruptcy
court to approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.84 This
decision, therefore, rested within the discretionary powers of the judiciary. 85 For approximately twenty-five years, the courts have attempted to
86
resolve the tension between the bankruptcy provisions and the NLRA.
chapter I1 filings since 1979. See Table 13, 1983 Annual Report of the Director, Admin.
Office of the United States Courts.
The import of Bildisco and the legislation is further clarified by combining these statistics
with the latest information regarding membership in labor organizations. The number of
nonagricultural labor organization members in 1980 was 22,811,000 or 25.2% of the total
number of nonagricultural employees in the country. (The NLRA does not include agricultural laborers in its definition of employees who receive protection under the Act. See 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).) See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of Nat'l Unions and
Employee Associations (1971, 1975, 1979) reprintedin U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 409 (103 ed. 1982-83). More specifically, in 1978, there were
174 unions in the country (excluding single firm and local unaffiliated unions), while union
membership was at 21,784,000, having held firm at approximately the same level over the
previous ten years. Id. at 408. The number of employees who will be affected by this decision and legislation, therefore, is substantial.
Membership in large labor organizations (those with 100,000 members or more) represents a more defined group of employees who will be affected by Bildisco and the legislation.
Moreover, many of the industries with which the largest labor organizations are associated
are undergoing financial difficulties. (In 1980, Teamsters membership stood at 1,891,000;
the Automobile Workers had 1,684,000 members; the Steelworkers had 1,238,000 members.
Id. at 409.) See, e.g., Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 1982, at FIA; Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1981, at 53,
col. 4.
Unions, however, have recognized the importance of the success of the reorganization in
sustaining employment of union workers. These unions have helped to aid employers in
saving their failing businesses by reducing, for example, the wage and benefit packages or
increasing production. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 n. 19
(1981) (noting several instances when unions have aided financially troubled employers to
revive their businesses); N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 12 (reporting instances of employees accepting wage reductions in response to threatened plant closings); Wash. Post,
Aug. 13, 1983, at B7, col. A.
84. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
85. See 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.15 (14th ed. 1978); see also King v. Baer, 482
F.2d 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,414 U.S. 1068 (1973) (the court's rejection of the contract
was within the discretion of the judges).
86. The first case to address this conflict was In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). In Klaber Bros., the union had appealed a decision of the bankruptcy
referee who had granted a motion of the debtor in possession to reject its collective bargaining agreement with the union. The court stated that § 713 of the Bankruptcy Act made no
distinction among the types of executory contracts that could be rejected. Therefore, it reasoned that "the power to permit rejection of an executory contract should be exercised where
rejection is to the advantage of the estate, [that is,] where the contract is detrimental, its
rejection should be permitted." Id. at 85. The court also noted that the NLRB was without
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Because of the lack of Supreme Court or legislative guidance, several standards for rejection were developed.
A.

Kevin Steel and REA Express. Accommodating the Code and the
NLRA Through the Use of the "'NewEntity" Theory

1. The Kevin Steel Standardof Review
The standard of review adopted by the majority of the courts was first
introduced in Shopmen's Local No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,Inc.8 7 Kevin Steel, a debtor in possession under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act
(Act),88 had successfully petitioned the bankruptcy court for rejection of
one of its three collective bargaining agreements. 89 The union appealed
the decision to the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. The court reversed, holding that the power of the bankruptcy
court to reject an executory contract did not extend to collective bargaining
agreements. 90
Upon appeal by Kevin Steel, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit examined section 713 of the Bankruptcy Act, the precursor
to section 365(a) of the Code, 9' and stated that under chapter l Ithe debtor
jurisdiction to interfere with the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. Id. It concluded that the referee's decision was justified and upheld the rejection of the agreement. Id
87. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). For commentary concerning this case, see generally
Levy and Blum, Limitations on Rejection of Union Contracts Under the Bankruptcy Act, 83

COM. L.J. 259 (1978); Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict. Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining Agreement, 80 MICH. L. REV. 134 (1981); Note, Bankruptcy Law-Labor
Law-Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements as Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy,
22 WAYNE L. REV. 165 (1975).
88. See supra note 1.

89. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 700. The NLRB found that Kevin Steel had committed
unfair labor practices in violation of § 8(a)(5) and § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA, by refusing to
execute the agreement that it had concluded with the union. 209 N.L.R.B. 493, 499 (1974).
The NLRB further found that Kevin Steel had violated § 8(a)(3) and § 8(a)(l) of the NLRA
"by discriminating against employees because of the insistence of their shop steward on
strict enforcement of the provisions of the Union's contract, and it ha[d] violated section
8(a)(l) by offering an employee an inducement to abandon the Union." Id
90. 381 F. Supp. 336, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
91. See supra note 17. The court also noted the lack of appellate opinions on point.
One reason cited for this lack of judicial guidance was that "only a hardy-[or] some might
say foolhardy-employer would provoke a strike by trying to terminate an existing labor
contract." Kevin Steel,519 F.2d at 703 (citing In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762, 766-67
(3d Cir. 1947)).
Only a few district court decisions had addressed this issue prior to Kevin Steel. See
Carpenters Local 2746 v. Turney Wood Prod., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re
Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp.
83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd on
other grounds, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947).
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in possession is a "new entity" that possesses its own rights and duties,
subject to the supervision of the bankruptcy court. 92 It emphasized that
within this framework, the debtor should not be considered a party under
section 8(d) of the NLRA to any labor agreement with the union and is
therefore not subject to the termination and modification provisions of that
section.93 The court noted the necessity of providing the debtor with a new
start. It asserted that the policy of the Code would be violated by placing
the struggling entity in a worse position than that of a successor employer
who normally is not bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining agreements. 94 Therefore, the Kevin Steel court held, the debtor in possession is
not precluded from rejecting the collective bargaining agreement by section 8(d) of the NLRA. 95
The court further asserted that a proper reconciliation of the statutory
conflict between the NLRA and the Code does not necessarily contemplate
92. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704; see Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict. Rejection of
a Debtor's Collective Bargaining Agreement, 80 MICH. L. REV. 134 (1981) (denying the existence of a statutory conflict).
93. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704. But see Jersey Juniors, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 329, 331-32
(1977) (debtor in possession in a chapter II proceeding held to be an alter ego of the bankrupt employer). Compare Airport Limousine Serv., 231 N.L.R.B. 932, 934 n.2 (1977) (holding court-appointed trustees alter egos of the original employers) with Blazer Indus., Inc.,
236 N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1978) (receiver is not an alter ego of the previous employer based on
significant reductions in operations and workforce).
94. 519 F.2d at 704. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417
U.S. 249, 256-62 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272, 291 (1972); Note, The
Bargaining Obligations of Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759, 760 (1975). There
are, however, possible exceptions to the rule that a successor employer is not bound by its
predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. In Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court
noted that in light of the difficulty of the successorship question, the myriad of factual circumstances and legal contexts in which it can arise, and the absence of congressional guidance as to its resolution, it is appropriate to emphasize the facts of each case. 417 U.S. at
256.
95. 519 F.2d at 706. The court also noted that critical commentary in this area favors
the instant result. Id.at 704; seeTHE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 817-18 (C. Morris ed. 1971);
Countryman, Executory Contractsin Bankruptcy.- Part 11,58 MINN. L. REV. 479-98 (1974).
The Second Circuit also examined how the existence of § 77(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, II
U.S.C. § 205(n) (1976) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982)), should be interpreted. This section provided that "no judge or trustee acting under [title iI] shall change
the wages or working conditions of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in
the Railway Labor Act." (The Code section today reads: "Notwithstanding section 365...
neither the court nor the trustee may change the wages or working conditions of employees
of the debtor established by a collective bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway
Labor Act . . .except in accordance with section 6 of such Act .... ") The Kevin Steel
court reasoned that the existence of § 77(n) of the Act reveals Congress' awareness of how to
remove labor agreements from the scope of the power to reject executory contracts. 519
F.2d at 704. The court, therefore, refused to require of employers not subject to the RLA
that which is demanded of those employers subject to its strictures. Id. at 705. It commented that "[t]he distinct problems of [employers under the RLA] and their importance to
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that the collective bargaining agreement should be rejected in all instances.
In each case, the bankruptcy court must scrutinize thoroughly the petition
to reject the agreement and balance the equities on both sides. 96 The court
concurred with the union that several matters relevant to this scrutiny include: (1) a possible improper motivation by the employer to rid itself of
the union;9 7 (2) convincing proof of the company's financial condition, including the source of its difficulties and the benefit to be gained by rejection of the contract; 98 and (3) a weighing of the equities against rejection,
including the loss of intangible employee rights.99 The court remanded
with instructions to reconsider the rejection issue in light of the considerations propounded." °
2. The Strict REA Express Test
One month after Kevin Steel,'' the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
the national economy are well recognized." 1d See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682, 687-89 (1963).
Finally, the court expressed the belief that few companies will enter into bankruptcy to
free themselves of the burdens of their labor agreements because "Itihe adverse consequences of bankruptcy are ordinarily far too harsh for that." 519 F.2d at 706. But see N.Y.
Times, May 3, 1983, at D2, col. I (several asbestos companies filed under chapter II to avoid
suits by employees over asbestos-related diseases and Wilson Foods Co. filed under chapter
I 1 to avoid higher labor costs).
96. 519 F.2d at 706-07. The court also expressly repudiated the business judgment rule.
Id. at 707; see infra notes 143-52 and accompanying text. It noted that "[tihe decision to
allow rejection should not be based solely on whether [rejection] will improve the financial
status of the debtor. Such a narrow approach totally ignores the policies of the Labor Act
and makes no attempt to accommodate to them." Id
97. 519 F.2d at 707; see, e.g., supra note 95. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., noting the petitioner's
disproportionate relationship of assets to liabilities (over two to one), concluded that the
bankruptcy proceeding was not commenced to promulgate a plan of reorganization but to
discard the present labor contract. 12 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). The petition to
reject the contract was denied. 1d
98. 519 F.2d at 707. A certain level of hardship imposed as a prerequisite to rejection
should preclude frivolous attempts to reject a collective bargaining agreement. See Note,
Bankruptcy Law-Labor Law-Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements as Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 165, 174 (1975).

99. 519 F.2d at 707. By relieving a debtor from its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, the court "may be depriving the employees affected of their seniority,
welfare and pension rights, as well as other valuable benefits which are incapable of forming
the basis of a provable claim for money damages." In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F.
Supp. 359, 361-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Other nonmonetary provisions at risk include grievance
and arbitration procedures and no strike/no lockout clauses.
100. 519 F.2d at 707.
101. Kevin Steelwas decided on July 24, 1975. Id at 698. Brotherhoodof Ry., Airline &
S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., was decided on August 27, 1975. REA Express, 523 F.2d

164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
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again was presented with a case involving bankruptcy law-labor law tensions. In Brotherhoodof Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.,1°2 a debtor in possession under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act had moved to reject two collective bargaining agreements subject to
the Railway Labor Act (RLA) °3 as onerous and burdensome under section 313 of the Act.' °4 The court summarized its decision in Kevin Steel
and stated that the standard for the bankruptcy court's allowing rejection
of the labor contract requires a showing by the debtor in possession that
the contract "is onerous and burdensome and that the equities tip decidedly in favor of termination."' 5
The court examined the plain wording of the RLA. It found that section
2 of the RLA does not permit a trustee to change the rates of pay or the
working conditions embodied in a collective bargaining agreement except
06
in the manner prescribed in the agreement or in section 6 of the RLA. 1
102. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1017 (1975), cert. denied,423 U.S. 1073
(1976). For further examination on this case, see Note, Labor Law-Bankrupto-Collective
Bargaining Agreement May Be Rejected in a Chapter XI ProceedingifDebtor in Possession
Can Show Agreement to Be Onerous and Burdensome, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1374 (1975); Note,
Labor-Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements in Chapter XI Arrangement Proceedings-Iron Workers Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Products,andBrotherhoodof Ry Clerks v. REA
Express Inc., 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 192 (1976).
103. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982).
104. Section 313 of the Act provides that "[ulpon the filing of a petition the court may
1)permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor upon notice to the parties to
such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the court may designate." 11 U.S.C.
§ 713(1) (1976) (codified as amended at II U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982)).
105. REA Express, 523 F.2d at 166. Although the court characterized its Kevin Steeltest
in this language, it should be noted that an "onerous and burdensome" requirement was
never expressly mentioned in the Kevin Steel opinion. The REA Express court rephrased the
Kevin Steel test by stating:
[W]here, after careful weighing of all of the factors and equities involved, including the interests sought to be protected by the RLA, a district court concludes that
an onerous and burdensome executory collective bargaining agreement will thwart
efforts to save a failing carrier in bankruptcy from collapse, the court may under
§ 313(1) authorize rejection or disaffirmance of the agreement.
Id.at 169.
106. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 156 (1982). The court stated that the purpose of the provisions of
the RLA, like those of the NLRA, are to "avoid disruptions of commerce by forcing the
parties to exhaust collective bargaining procedures and, where the RLA applies, to encourage use of arbitration and mediation before engaging in self-help strikes or other forms
of unilateral action." REA Express, 523 F.2d at 168. Section 151(a) provides that the general purposes of the RLA are:
(1) To avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier
engaged therein; . . .(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all
disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the
prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of
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The court noted that section 6, like section 8(d) of the NLRA, provides10 a7
protracted procedure for changing certain provisions of the contract.
Emphasizing that the purpose of the RLA is to avoid disruptions in commerce pending the resolution of the carrier's labor problems, the court further noted that section 313 of the Act places no restriction on the type of
executory contract that may be rejected.'" 8 The court reasoned that Congress' awareness of how to exclude certain contracts from the operation of
the bankruptcy laws is revealed in section 77(n) of the Act, which precludes the changing of wages or working conditions of railroad employees
except in the manner prescribed in the RLA.' 1 9 REA Express, however,
was involved in the surface and air transportation of express shipments; its
employees apparently did not work on trains.10 The court, therefore, did
not consider the REA Express employees to be railroad employees within
the meaning of section 77(n). "' Having thus established that section 77(n)
the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or
working conditions.
45 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982); see United Transp. Union v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 372 F.
Supp. 671 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aft'd,505 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Penn Central Transp. Co.,
347 F. Supp. 1356 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R.,
353 U.S. 30 (1957).
107. 523 F.2d at 169. The Second Circuit noted the protracted statutory modification
procedures for a collective bargaining agreement under the RLA. Id at 170-71; see 45
U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). The seventh paragraph of § 152 provides that "[n]o carrier, its
officers, or agents shall change the rates of pay, rules or working conditions of its employees,
as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements or
in section 156 ...." 45 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1982). Section 156 further requires 30 days written notice of an intended change in agreements affecting rates of pay as well as specifying
additional time-consuming procedures. 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1982). The court placed emphasis
on the need for the debtor in possession to act promptly to avoid onerous contract terms in
order to preserve the enterprise as an ongoing concern and preserve the employees' jobs.
523 F.2d at 170-7 1.
108. Id at 169.
109. Id.at 167-68. Section 77(n) provides that "no ... trustee ...shall change the
wages or working conditions of railroademployees except in the manner prescribed in the
RLA .... " .II U.S.C. § 205(n) (1976) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982))
(emphasis added).
110. 523 F.2d at 166.
111. Id at 168. But see In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965)
(collective bargaining agreements with pilots and stewardesses were subject to § 77(n) of the
RLA and thus could be changed only in conformity therewith). See supra note 95 for the
text of § 77(n) as presently codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982). Although § 1167 appears to
preclude the changing of wages and working conditions of all collective bargaining agreements subject to the Railway Labor Act, § 103(g) of the Code restricts the applicability of
§ 1167 to railroad reorganizations. 11 U.S.C. § 103(g) (1982). Thus, the seemingly broader
language of § 1167 is only as broad as its precursor, § 205(n) of the Bankruptcy Act, in that
both apply only to railroad employees. See In re Braniff Airways, 25 Bankr. 216 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1982) (§ 1167 is confined to collective bargaining agreements of railroad employees and does not apply to agreements of airline employees who are otherwise subject to the
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of the RLA did not preclude the application of the provisions of chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the court attempted to give effect to both statutory schemes and held that the contract could be rejected." 2
The court of appeals then examined whether the contract should be rejected in the instant case. The court suggested that REA Express became a
new juridical entity after entering chapter 11 proceedings and therefore
was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement entered into by
REA Express prior to the bankruptcy proceedings.113 It asserted that this
new employer is required, however, to bargain collectively with the employees' representative.' 14 The court inquired whether the chapter 11
debtor unilaterally could change the terms of employment prior to such
collective bargaining and concluded that, although a solvent successor employer financially might survive despite the maintenance of the status quo
with regard to wages and other terms and conditions of employment, this
new chapter 11 juridical entity needs flexibility in order to sustain the enterprise as a going concern." 5 The court, thus, held that REA Express
could implement new terms of employment without regard to the modifi1
cation procedures of section 6 of the RLA. 16
RLA); Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements by
Chapter11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 311 n.53 (1983).
112. 523 F.2d at 169. For a discussion of the underlying purpose of the RLA, see infra

note 106 and accompanying text.
113. 523 F.2d at 170. The court derived this rationale from its decision in Kevin Steel.
See Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704.
114. 523 F.2d at 170. The court of appeals stated that although "REA Express is not
bound to assume the collective bargaining agreement of its predecessor, [the pre-chapter II
company is,] as a new employer, obligated to bargain collectively with the representatives of
the employees hired by it." ld The court derived much of its successor employer law from
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., 406 U.S. 272 (1972). In Burns, the successor employer,
subject to the NLRA, hired 27 of its 42 employees from the predecessor employer. The
Supreme Court held that where the bargaining unit remains substantially unchanged, the
new employer must negotiate with the certified bargaining agent of the employees. Id. at
281. The court further held that, in spite of Bums' duty to bargain, "it was [not] bound to
observe the substantive terms of the [previous] collective bargaining contract." Id at 281-82.
The result is similar under the RLA. Section 152 has been interpreted to place upon the
carrier, which includes a debtor in possession under § 151, the positive duty to bargain collectively with the employees' representative. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp.
Union, 402 U.S. 570, 574-76 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1969); Bakaly & Bryan, Survival of the BargainingAgreement."
The Effect of Burns, 27 VAND. L. REV. 117 (1974); Gaus & Morris, Successorship and the
Collective BargainingAgreement.- Accommodating Wiley and Burns, 59 VA. L. REV. 1359
(1973); Comment, CriteriaforDeterminingEmployer Successorship-FactorAnalysis, Burns
and the Need/or a New Standard,II WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437 (1975); Note, The Bargaining Obligationsof Successor Employers, 88 HARV. L. REV. 759 (1975).
115. 523 F.2d at 170-71; see supra note 7.
116. 523 F.2d at 170; see supra note 107. The REA Express court also agreed with the
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Examining the decision of the district court, the court of appeals enunciated a strict standard in determining whether a collective bargaining
agreement should be rejected. It stated that rejection is warranted where it
"clearly appears to be the lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is
rejected, the carrier will collapse and the employees will no longer have
their jobs."" 7 The court remanded to determine if the contracts were sufficiently onerous and burdensome to warrant rejection." 8
Judicial interpretations of the Kevin Steel and REA Express standards
differed. Several lower courts applied the less stringent Kevin Steel standard, disregarding the subsequent REA Express test requiring a consideration of the possible imminent collapse of the debtor." 9 Other courts
synthesized the two standards into a single test requiring a threshold showdictum in Burns to the effect that there will be situations when the new employer retains all
the employees in the bargaining unit. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate for the
employer to consult with the employees before fixing new terms of employment. 523 F.2d at
171; see also Burns, 406 U.S. at 294-95. In general, as a new employer, a debtor in possession
may make any change he deems necessary within the employment relationship in order to
sustain the business. He may, for instance, alter the wages or fringe benefits. See Burns, 406
U.S. at 281-91. The debtor in possession, however, is required to comply with all legislation
pertaining to wages and hours or other statutory requirements. Although the duties of the
debtor in possession vis-a-vis the employees' representative are nonexistent insofar as the
old collective bargaining agreement is concerned, the obligations of the debtor as an employer to comply with the NLRA remain. Thus, the employer must participate in collective
bargaining if such a demand is made. Further, he must refrain from committing unfair
labor practices. See La Penna, Bankruptcy and the Collective BargainingAgreement, Proceedings, 29th N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 171-74 (1976).
In the instant case, the court suggested that REA Express should "give reasonable notice
of its proposed terms and [should] negotiate in good faith for a reasonable length of time
before putting them into effect." REA Express,523 F.2d at 171. The court maintained that
the successor employer was obligated to adhere to the terms of the predecessor's contract
only in those situations where the successor led the employees to believe that they would
have continuity of employment on the preexisting terms, not where the new employer from
the outset set forth the new terms of employment. 1d; see also Spruce Up Corp., 209
N.L.R.B. 194 (1974) (new employer distributed letters to all potential employees describing
the new terms of employment and requested those who wished to work for the new employer at those terms to so notify him).
117. 523 F.2d at 172 (emphasis added). Rejection, therefore, would be permitted where
"after a careful weighing of all the factors and equities involved, including the interests
sought to be protected by the RLA, a district court concludes that an onerous and burdensome executory collective bargaining agreement will thwart efforts to save a failing carrier in
bankruptcy from collapse .... ." d. at 169 (emphasis added). See REA Express, Inc. v.
BRAC, 92 L.R.R.M. 3244, 3245 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
118. 523 F.2d at 172. On remand the district court, following the stricter level of scrutiny
opined by the court of appeals, permitted rejection of only one of the collective bargaining
agreements. REA Express, Inc. v. BRAC, 92 L.R.R.M. 3244, 3245 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
119. See In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re Blue Ribbon Transp., 30 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re J.R. Elkins, Inc., 27 Bankr. 862
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Yellow Limousine, 22 Bankr. 807 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
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ing that a successful reorganization is contingent upon rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. 20 If such a showing was substantiated, the
court then engaged in a balancing of the equities test. ' 2' It is evident, then,
that a uniformly applied standard of review was lacking.
B. Brada Miller. Retaining a Balancing of the Equities Test Without the
"New Entity" Theory
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Matter
of Brada Miller Freight Systems, Inc.,'122 determined that the Kevin Steel
balancing of the equities test properly accommodated the competing interests in the Code and the NLRA. Brada Miller Freight Systems, a commodities carrier principally engaged in the trucking industry, filed a
reorganization petition under chapter 11 of the Code. In the meantime,
various locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters filed charges
with the NLRB complaining that certain conduct of Brada Miller relating
to the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement constituted unfair
labor practices. Brada Miller successfully petitioned the bankruptcy court
to reject its collective bargaining agreements pursuant to section 365(a) of
the Code. 123 The district court affirmed,' 24 and the NLRB and the affected unions appealed.
120. See In re U.S. Truck Co., 24 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982); In re David
Rosow, Inc., 9 Bankr. 190 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981); In re Connecticut Celery Co., 106
L.R.R.M. 2847 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re Studio Eight Lighting, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. 2429
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Comment, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391 (1981).

121. See supra note 105. The court in In re Alan Wood Steel Co. described the test as
follows:

First, the court should determine that the agreement is onerous and burdensome to
the estate, so that failure to reject will make a successful arrangement impossible.

Second, the equities must be balanced and found to favor debtor. Then, and only
then, may rejection of a collective bargaining agreement be permitted.
In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see In re Penn Fruit Co.,

92 L.R.R.M. 3548 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (three collective bargaining agreements were sufficiently
onerous and burdensome to warrant rejection and balancing the equities supported the termination of the contracts).
122. 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983). In addition to Bildisco, Brada Miller is one of the few
recent federal circuit court cases to reach the issue of the appropriate standard for rejection

of a collective bargaining agreement. In Borman's, Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets, 706 F.2d
187 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 263 (1984), the court expressly refused to rule on the

standard for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. 706 F.2d at 190 n.8. Further, in
Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980), the court also
felt no need to address the question of the appropriate standard for rejection. Id at 213-14
n.2.
123. Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 892-93.
124. Id. at 893. The district court found that the denial of the motion to reject would

have resulted in the collapse of Brada Miller and therefore the equities balanced in favor of
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The court of appeals considered whether section 8(d) or section 365(a)
governed the rejection or termination of collective bargaining agreements.
Unlike the other federal appellate courts that had addressed this issue, the
BradaMiller court was unpersuaded by the "new entity" theory. 2 5 It concluded that the debtor in possession is indistinguishable from the prebankruptcy company with respect to its obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement and the labor laws. 126 The court emphasized that it
is necessary to reconcile the conflicting statutory language, rather than to
rejection of the contract. The court concluded that this evidence satisfied the "test" propounded in Kevin Steel and REA Express. Id
125. Id. at 894-95. Other commentators have also criticized the "new entity" theory.
See, e.g., Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective BargainingAgreements by
Chapter 11, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 301 (1983) (" 'new entity' theory simply cannot withstand
close scrutiny; one need only observe that a 'new entity,' not a party to the contracts of its
prepetition predecessor, would scarcely need bankruptcy court approval to reject [its labor
contract]"); see also Note, The Labor Bankruptcy Conflict." Rejection of a Debtor's Collective
BargainingAgreement, 80 MICH. L. REV. 134, 137-42 (1981).
In NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1942), the court looked to
the substance of the relationship between the prebankruptcy company and the debtor in
possession and found their interests indistinguishable for the purpose of enforcing their responsibilities to the employees. The court's language is instructive:
Court supervision of corporate reorganization affords the operating possessor no
freedom from its statutory duty to its employees. And where managerial control
and economic interest of the debtor in possession and the reorganized company are
the same . . . then in no legally significant sense can the [debtor] be differentiated
from the debtor in possession so far as the employer-employee relationship is
concerned.
Id. at 43-44.
126. 702 F.2d at 895. The court wondered why, if Congress had intended that the debtor
in possession not be bound to the contracts of the prebankruptcy company, the debtor still
had to apply for rejection of its collective bargaining agreement with the bankruptcy court.
The court reasoned that if Congress had intended that the debtor in possession not be bound
to the contracts of the prepetition debtor, it could first have set up a statutory scheme
whereby the filing of the petition would constitute a breach of the collective bargaining
agreement and then granted the debtor in possession the discretionary power to assume, not
reject, certain favorable contracts. The court of appeals further noted that if the bankruptcy
court refuses to permit rejection of the contract, the debtor in possession is bound retroactively to the agreement. It asserted that the "proponents of the new entity concept have
failed to articulate a legal theory which justifies binding a 'non-party' to the agreement." Id
Moreover, the court noted that the debtor in possession may be held accountable for unfair
labor practices committed in the period between the filing of the chapter II petition and the
motion for rejection of the agreement. Id. Thus, the court concluded, the new entity theory
is viable only in situations where the court approves rejection of the contract. Id.
The court also considered the restrictive judicial commentary on the "new entity" theory.
In In re Unishops, Inc., 543 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1976), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit wrote:
We again caution that the language in [Kevin Steel stating that '[a] debtor in
possession under Chapter 11 . . . is not the same entity as the pre-bankruptcy company' should not be extended as a generalization in cases other than those involving labor collective bargaining agreements where the claim is that section 8(d) of
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sidestep the apparent clash through the use of an inadequate legal
concept. 127
The court examined the language of the Code to discern the scope of its
coverage. The court noted the existence of section 1167(a), through which
Congress specifically exempted collective bargaining agreements formed
under the RLA from the operation of section 365(a).128 It asserted that
section 1167(a) revealed the ability of Congress specifically to exempt certain labor contracts from the operation of section 365(a).' 29 Although the
court did not fully accept the successor employer-debtor in possession
analogy previously proferred by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Kevin Steel 13' and REA Express,'3 1 it did recognize the significance of
several factors that would mitigate against binding the chapter 11 debtor to
the substantive terms of the collective bargaining agreement entered into
by the previous employer.' 32 The court emphasized the difficulty that
would arise in finding fresh management and capital to participate in a
reorganization effort if the debtor were not free to reject the collective bargaining agreement.' 33 The court asserted that Congress could not have
intended the ultimate fate of the company to rest solely in the hands of the
employees. It stressed that there are other interests at stake, such as those
of the creditors and shareholders. The court concluded that labor contracts are not immune from the flexibility provided by section 365(a).' 3 4
the NLRA ... precludes disaffirmance of the labor agreement in a Chapter II
proceeding without taking the steps required under 8(d) of the Labor Act ....
Id.at 1018-19; see Truck Drivers Local No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 319-20 (2d
Cir. 1976) (one cannot take literally the statement that a debtor in possession is not a party
to the labor agreement). The Brada Miller court, however, was unpersuaded by the constraining language of Unishops. The court saw no evidence of an intent by Congress to limit
application of the "new entity" theory to collective bargaining agreements. 702 F.2d at 896.
127. Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 896.
128. See supra note 95.
129. The significance of Congress' failure to exempt other types of collective bargaining
agreements from § 365 is strengthened by the numerous amendments to the bankruptcy and
labor laws. The 1978 overhaul of the Bankruptcy Act left untouched the narrow exception
for railway labor agreements. Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 896-97.
130. See Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704.
131. See REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170.
132. Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 897. The court stated:
[11f a corporation attempting to reorganize under Chapter 11 is compelled to retain
verbatim its pre-bankruptcy collective bargaining agreement, regardless of the degree to which the burdens imposed by the agreement contributed to the corporation's demise, it would often be impossible to induce fresh management and capital
to participate in the revitalization effort of a bankrupt enterprise.
Id.
133. Id
134. Id
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The Brada Millercourt then focused its attention on the proper standard
for the bankruptcy court to apply in determining if rejection of the collective bargaining agreement is appropriate. The court analyzed the Kevin
Steel and RE4 Express standards and found that the Kevin Steel test provided a satisfactory accommodation of the competing interests. 135 It refused to subordinate the myriad of diverse interests at stake solely to the
issue of the ability of the debtor in possession to establish that, absent rejection of the agreement, the company would collapse. The court maintained that the possibility of a forced liquidation, albeit an important
consideration, should not be dispositive of the issue of the permissibility of
36
rejection of the contract. 1
The court also suggested that the following several factors may be considered by the bankruptcy court in striking a balance among the competing
interests: (1) the possibility of liquidation, with and without rejection, and
the aggregate impact of liquidation on the interested parties;' 1 (2) the
claims of employees and other interested parties that will arise due to the
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement, the adequacy of relief to
satisfy such claims, and the impact of the claims on the debtor; 138 (3) the
135. Id at 899. The court agreed with the Third Circuit's Bildisco opinion, particularly
with regard to the "prudential consideration that the imposition of the strict REA Express
standard unduly exalts the perpetuation of the collective bargaining agreement over the
more pragmatic consideration of whether the employees will continue to have jobs at all."
Id. at 898-99 (quoting NLRB v. Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1982)).
136. 702 F.2d at 899.
137. Id. In a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, to which a debtor under chapter II may
convert his case pursuant to II U.S.C. § 112(a) (1982), the distribution of the property of
the estate is handled under II U.S.C. § 726 (1982). Property is distributed among priority
claimants as determined by II U.S.C. § 507 (1982). See infra note 138. Further, the debtor
must pay his debts in full to each priority class before he can distribute anything to the next
class. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(1) (1982). Distribution to general unsecured creditors is next,
pursuant to II U.S.C. § 726(a)(2) (1982). See Note, The Bankruptcy Laws'Effects on Collective BargainingAgreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391-94 (1981).
The Brada Miller court also stated that in determining the possibility of liquidation, it
should be recognized that the debtor in possession is required to bargain with the union,
even after rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. BradaMiller, 702 F.2d at 899; see
Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704; REA Express, 523 F.2d at 170. Further, employees retain the
right to strike should negotiations fail. See In re Ryan Co., 83 Lab. Cas. 10,487, at 17, 952
n. I (D. Conn. 1978). Therefore, the possibility of an employee strike should also enter into
the court's evaluation. BradaMiller, 702 F.2d at 899. In addition, the potential savings to
the debtor should be examined if the contract is rejected. These savings can be measured as
the difference between the union and nonunion wages and benefits or the lowering of the
priority of some union claims. See infra note 138.
138. Section 501 of the Code specifies the kinds of claims that are entitled to priority in
distribution and the order of their priority. I I U.S.C. § 501 (1982). For unions, wages and
salaries earned during the reorganization period are considered administrative expenses
under II U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982). Further, under § 507(a)(1), administrative expenses
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cost-spreading abilities of the parties; 39 and (4) the good or bad faith of
the parties in seeking a solution to their immediate labor problems.'4
Concluding that the polestar is to do equity between claims under the labor contract and other claims against42 the debtor,14 1 the court remanded in
light of the standards propounded.
C. The Business Judgment Rule
It is well established that the standard for rejection of an ordinary commercial contract involves merely a showing that rejection would benefit the
estate.' 4 3 For many years, this standard, known as the business judgment
rule, also was applied to the rejection of collective bargaining agreements.'" Further, in spite of the more recent rulings in Kevin Steel, REA
are granted first priority and must be paid in cash on the effective date of the plan pursuant
to II U.S.C. § i 129(a)(9)(A) (1982). See supra note 6. The plan may also provide for deferred cash payments of a value equal to the allowed amount of such claim. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 507, 1129(a)(9)(B)(i) (1982). In addition, "unsecured claims for wages, salaries or commissions, including vacation, severance and sick leave pay earned by an individual within 90
days before the date of the filing of the petition" receive third priority. I I U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(3)(A) (1982). Unsecured claims for contributions to employee benefit plans arising
from services rendered within 180 days before the filing of the chapter I I petition receive
fourth priority. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(A) (1982). Finally, all claims for services rendered
prior to 90 days before the filing of the chapter II petition receive no priority. Should the
debtor in possession, however, elect to continue to receive benefits from the employees subject to the collective bargaining agreement pending the decision to assume or reject the contract, the debtor will be liable for the reasonable value of the services performed. See
Philadilphia v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168, 174 (1941).
139. Balancing the equities with regard to cost-spreading ability, the court suggested that
an eventual $50,000 loss to a group of employees earning $20,000 per year would have a
more impoverishing effect than a $100,000 loss to a group of banks or a major distributor.
Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 900.
140. The court suggested several points of observation, including whether the employer
sought concessions from the employees prior to its attempts to reject the contract and
whether the union was amenable to the course of action. Id In In re Price Chopper Supermarkets, the court directed the employer to attempt to renegotiate the contract prior to the
petition for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. 19 Bankr. 462, 466 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1982) Courts will view favorably attempts by the employer to negotiate with the
union. See In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed, 595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Ryan Co., 16 CBC 101 (D. Conn. 1978).
141. Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 901 (quoting In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 81)).
142. Id
143. See Group of Institutional Inv. v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523
(1943); In re Minges, 602 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Tilco, Inc., 558 F.2d 1369 (10th Cir.
1977); Feldman v. Trans-East Air, 497 F.2d 352 (2d Cir. 1974); In re OPM Leasing Serv., 23
Bankr. 104 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Marina Enter., 14 Bankr. 327 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1981).
144. In re Klaber Bros. Co., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). This court noted that the
Bankruptcy Act delineated no distinction between classes of executory contracts. Thus, rejection of the collective bargaining agreement should be permitted where it is to the advan-
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Express and BradaMiller, several145lower courts still continued to apply this
very flexible standard of review.
In In re Ateco Equipment, Inc.,146 the debtor, a chapter 11 company,
wished to reject its collective bargaining agreement. The bankruptcy court
acknowledged the line of cases beginning with Kevin Steel, yet determined
that because these cases were decided under the Bankruptcy Act, they were
not controlling under the Code. 147 Moreover, in light of the comprehensive nature of the new Code and congressional awareness of cases such as
Kevin Steel l' during the enactment of the Code, it was deemed relevant
that no special test was established for collective bargaining agreements in
general. 149 Further, the court noted that it is now easier for aggrieved
union members to file damage claims under section 502(c) of the Code
than under section 93(d) of the Act.' 5 ° This reveals possible congressional
intent to protect employees' rights through that mechanism.'
The court
thus concluded that it would not legislate into section 365(a) special protage of the estate. Id at 85. It seems, however, that either the Kevin Steel or REA Express
ruling would control in the Second Circuit.
145. See, e.g., Local Joint Executive Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal.
1976), aft'd, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Concrete Pipe Mach. Co., 28 Bankr. 837
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983); InreAteco Equip., Inc., 18 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982); In
re South Union Coal Co., Bankr. No. 81-1648 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
146. 18 Bankr. 915 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).

147. Id.at 916. The court quoted from

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY:

"Although a mere

showing that rejection would improve the financial condition of the debtor did not suffice
under the Act, the result may be different under the Code due to the failure of Congress to
incorporate a requirement of burdensomeness into section 365." 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 365.03, at 365-18 (15th ed. 1980).
Collier, however, further states that "[i]n any event, due to the serious nature of the financial consequences of the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, courts may continue
to require a strong showing of burden and consideration of the interests of the employees."
Id.at 365-17 to 18.
148. See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379-82
(1982); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-98 (1979); United States v.
Patco, 653 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub noma.Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Org. v. United States, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981). These cases illustrate the canon of statutory
construction that Congress is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of a statute.
149. 18 Bankr. at 916-17.
150. Id.at 916. The court noted that Congress must have known how to exclude collective bargaining agreements from the workings of chapter 11 due to the specific exception for
such contracts subject to the RLA. See 11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982), supra note 95.
151. Under former 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1976), now codified at 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982),
the claims of the employees arising from the breach caused by the rejection might not have
been allowable if the court determined that the claims were not capable of reasonable estimation, that is, they were too speculative. Under § 502(c) of the Code, any contingent or
unliquidated claims must be estimated for the purpose of settling the bankrupt estate. 11
U.S.C. § 502(c) (1982). Thus, losses attributable to the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement, such as seniority rights or fringe benefits, shall be estimated.
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tection for collective bargaining agreements. Rejection of the contract was
permitted simply because it would be beneficial to the debtor company.15
In sum, at one time or another, three different approaches had been utilized to determine if rejection of the collective bargaining agreement was
appropriate. It is thus not surprising that the Supreme Court decided the
time had come to develop a uniform standard of review for the rejection of
collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. The time also had come
to resolve the analytical problem concerning the ability of the NLRB to
find the debtor in possession guilty of an unfair labor practice for unilaterally modifying or terminating the agreement prior to receiving permission
from the bankruptcy court to reject the agreement.
II.

NLRB v BILDISCO & BILDisco

A.

The Statutory Conflict Resolved

5 3 the United States Supreme Court
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,1
held that after a sufficient showing that reasonable, yet unsuccessful, efforts have been made to negotiate a contract modification, a bankruptcy
court may permit a debtor in possession to reject its collective bargaining
agreement with a union." 4 The Court unanimously ruled that the standard to be used by the bankruptcy court in determining whether rejection
of the labor contract should be permitted requires a showing that the collective bargaining agreement burdens the estate and that the equities balance in favor of rejection.'5 " Further, a divided Court held that a debtor's
unilateral termination or modification of the collective bargaining agreement, prior to formal approval of contract rejection by the bankruptcy
court, does not constitute a violation of section 8(d) of the NLRA. 6 The
majority balanced the policies of the Code and the NLRA in reaching its
standard for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement in bankruptcy.
The Court, however, failed to balance the policies of the Code and the
NLRA in concluding that the post-petition unilateral modification does
not violate section 8(d).
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist first addressed the applicability of section 365 to collective bargaining agreements under the
NLRA. 15 7 He focused on the plain language of section 365118 and indi152. Ateco Equip., 18 Bankr. at 917.
153. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
154. Id. at 1196-97.

155. Id. at 1196.
156. Id at 1200.
157. Id. at 1194.

158. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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cated that the term "executory contract" includes unexpired collective bargaining agreements.' 59 Further, he noted that the existence of section
1167, which exempts collective bargaining agreements subject to the Railway Labor Act from the operation of section 365(a) of the Code, 160 reveals
congressional ability to draft an exclusion for certain collective bargaining
agreements.' 6 1 Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress' failure to develop a similar exemption for the labor contracts at issue in Bildisco indicates that the legislators intended to apply section 365(a) to collective
162
bargaining agreements covered by the NLRA.
The Court then addressed the standard by which a bankruptcy court
may authorize the debtor in possession to reject its labor contract. Recognizing the special nature of a collective bargaining agreement and the consequent "law of the shop" that it creates, 163 the Court reasoned that a
standard stricter than the "business judgment" test should be used.' 64 It
considered the very strict REA Express standard advocated by the union
and the NLRB. While acknowledging the canon of statutory construction
that Congress is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of a statute, 165 the Court rejected as irrelevant the fact that the legislative history of
the law of municipal bankruptcies had expressly noted the REA Express
decision. 166 It observed that the Kevin Steel decision also was mentioned
in the legislative history of municipal bankruptcy law. 167 Because the legislative report did not indicate a preference for either decision, 168 the
Court inferred that Congress merely had approved a higher standard of
169
review than the business judgment test.
The Court examined the utility of the strict REA Express test in light of
the Code's purposeful grant of flexibility to the debtor. It noted that this
strict test reduces the myriad competing considerations to a single issue:
whether rejection of the collective bargaining agreement is necessary to
prevent the debtor from going into liquidation. 70 The Court asserted that
159. 104 S. Ct. at 1194.
160. See supra note 95.

161. 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
162. Id. at 1195.
163. Seesupranotes II, 13, 16.
164. 104 S. Ct. at 1195; see supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 148.
166. 104 S. Ct. at 1196; see supra note 16.
167. 104 S. Ct. at 1196; see supra note 16. The Court noted that these two cases reflect
different formulations of the appropriate standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements. 104 S. Ct. at 1196; see supra notes 105, 117 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 16.

169. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
170. Id.
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the REA Express test could present an evidentiary burden for the debtor in
possession that could interfere with its effective reorganization," 7' thereby
contravening the Code's interest in ensuring flexibility for the chapter 11
business. Thus, the Court held that, in order to receive permission from
the bankruptcy court to reject a labor contract, the debtor in possession
must show that the collective bargaining agreement is burdensome to the
estate and that the equities balance in favor of rejection of the
72
agreement. 1
Justice Rehnquist further emphasized that, prior to acting on a petition
to modify or reject a collective bargaining agreement, a bankruptcy court
should be satisfied that reasonable efforts have been made to negotiate a
voluntary modification of the agreement and that these efforts have failed
to produce a satisfactory solution. 7 3 He maintained that this requirement
comports with the NLRA's policies of avoiding industrial strife and encouraging collective bargaining. 174 Justice Rehnquist concluded that, after
this requirement is fulfilled, the bankruptcy court may act upon a petition
to reject because the policies of the NLRA would have been served
75
adequately.
Finally, the Court reasoned that, because the policy of chapter 11 is to
rehabilitate the debtor, rejection should not be allowed unless that policy
would be served in light of all the interests affected by the reorganization
process.1 76 It stated that, in determining what constitutes a successful reorganization, a court must balance the interests of the debtor, the creditors,
and the employees. 77 Because the bankruptcy court is a court of equity,
the Court asserted that it must be granted the flexibility to consider all
78
evidence relevant to the balancing issue.'
The majority then considered whether the NLRB can find the debtor in
171.

Id.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
175. 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
176. Id

177. In detailing this balancing, the Court stated:
The Bankruptcy Court must consider the likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the reduced value of the creditors' claims
that would follow from affirmance and the hardship that would [be] imposed on

them, and the impact of rejection on the employees. In striking the balance the
Bankruptcy Court must consider not only the degree of hardship faced by each
party, but also any qualitative differences between the types of hardships each may
face.
Id.
178. Id.
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possession guilty of violating the NLRA where it has unilaterally terminated or modified the collective bargaining agreement prior to receipt of
bankruptcy court approval to reject the contract. The Court initially ex'
amined the post-petition employer's status. Rejecting the "alter ego"179
and "successor employer"' classifications, the Court characterized the
debtor in possession as the same entity that existed before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition.' 8 1 It asserted that the prepetition and post-petition
entities, however, are distinguishable in that the latter has statutory powers
to deal with contracts in a manner not possible absent the bankruptcy filing. ' 2 This debtor needs the vital power to reject executory contracts in
order to fulfill the basic purposes of chapter 11 and to complete a successful reorganization. 83 Thus, the Court reasoned, labeling the post-petition
modification as an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(d) would
undermine the ability of the debtor in possession to request rejection of the
84
contract.'
The Bildisco Court analyzed several Code sections to discover the postpetition status of the collective bargaining agreement with respect to section 8(d) of the NLRA. It noted the more liberal time constraints imposed
upon a debtor in possession in a chapter 11 proceeding than those imposed
upon a trustee in a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding to assume or reject a
contract.' 85 The Court inferred that Congress intended to give a chapter
11 debtor more flexibility in deciding whether to reject a contract. 186 Further, the Court observed that section 365(g)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
specifies that the rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach of
such contract that relates back to the date immediately preceding the filing
of the bankruptcy petition. 87 It also stated that claims arising after the
filing of the bankruptcy petition, such as those for breach of the collective
bargaining agreement, are presented through the normal administrative
process that treats such claims as though they had arisen before the date of
179. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

181.

104 S. Ct. at 1197. Thus, the "new entity" theory adopted by the lower court and

the Second Circuit in Kevin Steel and REA Express was rejected. See supra notes 92-95, 113

and accompanying text.
182. 104 S. Ct. at 1197; see supra note 16. The Court maintained that, were the debtor in
possession automatically saddled with a burdensome executory contract, the rehabilitative
infusion of capital by creditors into the ailing firm might be jeopardized. 104 S. Ct. at 1197;
see supra note 132.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

104 S. Ct. at 1197-98.
Id
Id at 1198; see supra note 7.
104 S. Ct. at 1198.
Id at 1198-99; see supra note 32.
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the filing of the bankruptcy petition.1 88 The Court concluded that suits
may not be brought against the debtor in possession under the post-petition contract but only through the Code's normal administrative process
that bases such claims on the pre-petition collective bargaining agreement.' 8 9 The Court further concluded that, because the filing of the petition in bankruptcy means that the labor contract is no longer immediately
enforceable, the NLRB is precluded from filing unfair labor charges
against the debtor in possession under section 8(d). Thus, the Court found
that because the NLRB could not require adherence to the terms of the
contract (the practical result of enforcing section 8(d)), there was no violation of the NLRA.' 90
The Bildisco Court concluded by noting that although the debtor in possession does not commit an unfair labor practice when it unilaterally terminates or modifies the labor contract, such conduct does undermine the
policies of the NLRA.19 ' The Court emphasized that the debtor in possession is not relieved of all its bargaining obligations under the NLRA. The
Court stated that the debtor in possession must bargain in good faith under
section 8(a)(5) with the employees' representatives over the terms of a new
contract pending rejection of the existing contract or following official approval by the bankruptcy court to reject the former contract.' 92 Justice
Rehnquist cautioned, however, that, despite this duty to bargain, the
debtor in possession does not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally modifying the collective bargaining agreement prior to formal bank188.

104 S. Ct. at 1198-99; see supra note 32. In a footnote, the Court referred to several

Code sections that it thought indicated the extent to which Congress wished to afford special
protection for claims of employees arising out of the rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement. 104 S. Ct. at 1199 n.12. See II U.S.C. § 502(c), supra note 151; 11 U.S.C.
§§ 503(b)(I)(A), 507(a)(3), supra note 138.
189. 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
190. Id. The Court set forth another rationale supporting the inapplicability of § 8(d). It
noted that this statutory provision applies to unilateral actions of a party to the collective
bargaining agreement. See supranote 13. The Court stated that in a chapter 11 case, however, the modification of the contract has been accomplished by operation of law, not by the
employer's actions. Thus, the Court reasoned, because the filing of the bankruptcy petition
made the contract unenforceable, the § 8(d) requirements are not applicable to the employer's unilateral termination or modification of an already unenforceable contract. 104 S.
Ct. at 1200.
The Court further ruled that it would not require the employer to "bargain to impasse"
before enabling it to seek rejection of the contract by the bankruptcy court. The Court
reasoned that rejection of the requirement of full compliance with the § 8(d) procedures also
necessitated the subordination of any corresponding duty to bargain to impasse under
§ 8(a)(5) to the exigencies of bankruptcy. Id.; see supra note 12, infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
191. 104 S. Ct. at 1200.
192. Id. at 1201.
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ruptcy court action. 9 3
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, disagreed with the majority's
assertion that suspension of the enforcement of the collective bargaining
agreement serves the policies of the Code and therefore Congress could
not have intended for the restrictive requirements of section 8(d) still to
control. 194 He maintained that the majority did not adequately accommodate the policies of both statutes. 9 5 Thus, he reasoned that an examina96
tion of the policies and provisions of both statutes was necessary. 1
Justice Brennan considered the applicability of section 8(d) absent the
countervailing provisions and policies of the Code. He maintained that
section 8(d) must be construed with sufficient flexibility so as not to defeat
the policies of the NLRA, 197 and that deference should be accorded to
NLRB interpretations of the NLRA.' 9 8 Because the Board has ruled that
the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not affect the applicability of section 8(d),' 99 Justice Brennan asserted that this determination should be
193. Id.
194. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In a footnote, the dissent criticized the majority's § 365(g)(1) analysis (basically, that the debtor is liable only for
the reasonable value of benefits conferred, and not for the obligations under the collective
bargaining agreement). Id. at 1203 n.8. See supranotes 187-90 and accompanying text. The
dissent stated that the function of § 365(g)(1) is to treat claims stemming from the rejection
of the contract as general unsecured claims. 104 S. Ct. at 1203 n.8. See supra note 32. Thus,
the extent to which the claims are allowed and the priority of such claims are determined
under the rules for allowance of prepetition claims. 104 S. Ct. at 1203 n.8. See supra notes
32, 138. The dissent concluded that statutory analysis, therefore, reveals that § 365(g)(l)
does not relate to the unenforceability of contracts during the post-petition, prebankruptcy
court order period. 104 S. Ct. at 1203 n.8.
195. 104 S. Ct. at 1204. Justice Brennan maintained that the majority simply concentrated on the policies of the Code. He concluded that under such an analysis a holding that
§ 8(d) is inapplicable once the bankruptcy petition is filed would naturally follow. Id
196. Id. at 1205. Although Justice Brennan concluded that Congress did not intend to
affect the applicability of § 8(d) with the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a debtor, he did
concur with the majority that the debtor in possession need not comply with the notice
requirements and waiting period restrictions of that statutory provision. Id. at 1204 n.9; see
supra note 13. Justice Brennan also agreed that the debtor in possession need not bargain to
impasse, for the debtor may need an expeditious determination concerning whether he may
reject the collective bargaining agreement. 104 S. Ct. at 1204 n.9; see infra notes 245-48 and
accompanying text.
197. 104 S. Ct. at 1205 (citing NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 290 (1956); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1955)). See supra notes 11-13.
198. 104 S. Ct. at 1205 (citing NLRB v. Ironworkers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1974), supranote
26; NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 267 (1974); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 236 (1962)). See NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960); NLRB v.
Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957).
199. 104 S. Ct. at 1205 (citing ISG Extrusion Toolings, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 114 (1982);
Airport Limousine Serv., 231 N.L.R.B. 932 (1977)). See supranote 26. In a footnote, Justice
Brennan distinguished Blazer Indus., 236 N.L.R.B. 103, 109-10 (1978), where drastic
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respected.2 °°
In examining the language of the NLRA, Justice Brennan noted that
section 8(d) applies only to parties to a contract that is "in effect." 20 ' Although agreeing with the majority's rejection of the "new entity" theory,20 2
he maintained that, in contrast with the majority's assertion that the postpetition collective bargaining agreement is not an "enforceable contract,, 20 3 the agreement does retain sufficient vitality to be considered "in
effect" within the meaning of the NLRA.2 °4 Justice Brennan pointed to
various indicia of the contract's effectiveness during the post-petition interim period. He noted that if the debtor in possession assumes the contract, that assumption relates back to the filing of the petition, 2 5 and all
compensation earned by the employees under the contract becomes a first
priority administrative expense. 20 6 Brennan emphasized that the employees, however, will have general unsecured claims resulting from the breach
of the collective bargaining agreement 2 7 and that some of these claims
will have originated from the employer's obligations under the contract.20 8
Therefore, he concluded, the Code itself reveals that whether the agreement is rejected or accepted, it will Support a claim arising out of the contractual obligations in the post-petition period. Thus, the contract is "in
effect" for the purposes of section 8(d).2 09
changes in the debtor company's operations occurred immediately after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Justice Brennan stated that no such changes were shown in the instant
case. 104 S. Ct. at 1205 n.10.
200. 104 S. Ct. at 1205.
201. Id. at 1206; see supra note 13.
202. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. In a footnote, Justice Brennan criticized
the Second Circuit's misplaced reliance on the doctrine of successorship applied in Burns.
104 S. Ct. at 1205-06 n. 11. See supra notes 92-94, 113-14 and accompanying text. He stated
that the holding in Burns that the successor was not bound by the predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement was based on the congressional policy of not binding an employer to
terms that it had not agreed to. Justice Brennan asserted that Burns was irrelevant because,
in the instant case, the debtor in possession was the same employer who had agreed to the
collective bargaining agreement. 104 S. Ct. at 1206 n. 11.
203. 104 S. Ct. at 1206; see supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
204. 104 S. Ct. at 1206-07. Justice Brennan inferred that because the phrase "unenforceable contract" does not appear in the language of § 8(d), the majority must have meant that
the contract was not "in effect" within the meaning of § 8(d). See supra note 13.
205. See supra note 32.
206. 104 S. Ct. at 1206; see supra note 138.
207. 104 S. Ct. at 1206; see supra note 138.
208. 104 S. Ct. at 1206.
209. Id. at 1207. As further evidence of the vitality of the contract in the post-petition
interval, Justice Brennan noted that the debtor in possession will be liable for the reasonable
value of services performed. Frequently, the reasonable value will be measured from the
contract rate. Id. See, e.g., Diversified Servs. v. Harralson, 369 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1966);
In re Chase Commissary, II F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); see also Fogel, Executory Con-
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Justice Brennan also focused briefly on the definitional language of the
NLRA. He inferred that Congress intended for the section 8(a)(5) duty to
bargain to apply to debtors in possession.2"' Justice Brennan reasoned
that because the debtor in possession is considered an employer within the
NLRA,2 1' and because the section 8(a)(5) and section 8(d) bargaining requirements are imposed on "employers," 2' 12 the logical inference is that
Congress intended the restrictions on unilateral modification to apply to
debtors in possession.2 13
In analyzing the applicability of the section 8(d) requirements from a
policy-oriented perspective, Justice Brennan underscored the fundamental
aim of the NLRA to establish industrial peace and the crucial role collective bargaining plays in the achievement of that goal.2 14 In his view, the
section 8(d) requirements are designed specifically to prevent the labor unrest that will result from an employer's unilateral modification of contracts.2 15 Justice Brennan rejected the proposition that the threat to
industrial peace is any less one day after the filing of the bankruptcy petition than it is one day before the petition was filed. 2 16 He concluded that
tracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REV. 341, 370 (1980).
Thus, in Justice Brennan's view, the contract must be deemed sufficiently "in effect" for the
purposes of § 8(d). 104 S. Ct. at 1207.
In a footnote, Justice Brennan also cited several cases in which the courts characterized
the contract as remaining "in effect" until rejected. Id at 1207 n. 13. For instance, in Federal's, Inc. v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1977), the court characterized the
executory contracts as remaining "in effect" until rejected. Id at 579 (quoting 8 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
3.15[6] (14th ed. 1976)). In Smith v. Hill, 317 F.2d 539, 542 n.6 (9th Cir.
1963), the court stated that the executory contract "continues in effect" unless rejected. Id.at
542 n.6 (quoting 8 COLLIER, supra at 3.15[6]).
Justice Brennan also asserted a fallback position presuming the contract was not "in effect." In a footnote, he analogized the unilateral modification of a contract not "in effect"
with the Court's holding in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). 104 S.Ct. at 1207 n.14. In
Katz, the parties had yet to complete their negotiation for an initial collective bargaining
agreement. Nevertheless, the Court stated that an "employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is . . .a violation of § 8(a)(5) for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of 8(a)(5) much as does a flat
refusal [to negotiate]." 369 U.S. at 743. Thus, if an employer cannot change the employment conditions before a contract is achieved, it follows that it should not be able to do so
post-petition before the contract is rejected, yet nonetheless unenforceable. 104 S.Ct. at
1207.
210. 104 S.Ct. at 1207; see supra notes 12, 13.
211. See supra note 12.
212. See supra notes 12, 13.
213. 104 S.Ct. at 1207.
214. Id.at 1207-08; see supra note 11.
215. 104 S. Ct. at 1208 (citing PittsburghPlate Glass, 404 U.S. at 157); see supra note 13.
216. 104 S. Ct. at 1208. In a footnote, Justice Brennan noted several instances of labor
unrest resulting from post-petition unilateral modifications. Id at 1208 n.16. On Sept. 24,
1983, Continental Airlines filed a chapter I1 petition and subsequently reduced wages of
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permitting unilateral modifications of the collective bargaining agreement
in violation of section 8(d) during the post-petition period seriously undermines the NLRA's goal of maintaining industrial peace. Therefore, he
reasoned, Congress must have intended the requirements of section 8(d) to
remain applicable following the filing of a bankruptcy petition. 217
Justice Brennan then examined the policies and provisions of the Code
and found nothing that rendered section 8(d) inapplicable. He considered
whether the application of section 8(d) would so undermine the policies of
the Code that, despite substantial impairment of the aims of the NLRA,
Congress could not have intended this section to be applicable following
the filing of the bankruptcy petition. He recognized that the option to reject a contract is vital to accomplishing the rehabilitative goals of the
Code.2" 8 He rejected, however, the majority's conclusion that an employer
needs the power to violate a collective bargaining agreement, before it is
formally rejected, to assure a successful reorganization. If the contract
were so burdensome that even temporary adherence might invite liquidation, the debtor could seek immediate rejection.2" 9 Justice Brennan reasoned that, since a unilateral modification frequently will lead to labor
difficulties22 ° that are inimical to a successful reorganization, such modifications might 1 actually decrease the prospects for successful
22
reorganization.
Justice Brennan next addressed the conflict between the Code's flexibility and the rigid requirements of section 8(d). He noted that Code section
365(d)(2) 22 2 permits the nondebtor party to a contract with the debtor in
possession to request the bankruptcy court to restrict the time period
within which the debtor must assume or reject the contract. Justice Brennan inferred from this provision that Congress never intended to give the
debtor in possession unlimited flexibility.22 3 He concluded that section
365(d)(2) reveals congressional intent to protect the rights of nondebtor
parties. 224 He further suggested that the danger of a debtor in possession
employees 45% to 50%. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1983, at DI, col. 2. On Oct. 3, 1983, Continental's flight employees went on strike. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at B13, col. 3. The scenario was similar with the Wilson Foods Corp. which filed a chapter 11 petition and several
days later reduced wages up to 50%. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1983, at D2, col. 1. This wage
reduction prompted a strike the following June. N.Y. Times, June I1, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
217. 104 S. Ct. at 1208-09.
218. Id. at 1209; see supra note 16.
219. 104 S. Ct. at 1209.
220. See, e.g., supra note 216.
221. 104 S. Ct. at 1209.
222. See supra note 6.
223. 104 S. Ct. at 1210.
224. Id
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prematurely rejecting a favorable collective bargaining agreement because
of financial pressures placed upon him to assume or reject in light of the
restrictions of section 8(d) is largely illusory.2 25 Employees recognize that
they will lose their jobs should the reorganization fail2 26 and thus the
debtor in possession should be able to negotiate a contract at least as
favorable as the one rejected.2 27 Thus, Justice Brennan concluded, that
holding the post-petition debtor to the requirements of section 8(d) will not
thwart the aim of the Code by seriously undermining the chance for a
successful reorganization.2 28
Finally, Justice Brennan noted that allowing the debtor to disregard the
collective bargaining agreement after the filing of a bankruptcy petition
would deprive the parties to the agreement of their negotiated "law of the
shop. ' 229 He asserted that without this system of industrial government,
the resolution of the parties' disputes would be determined by the opponents' relative strengths. 230 Stating that this potential for industrial strife is
antithetical to the policies of the NLRA, Brennan concluded that the prospects of a successful reorganization would not be jeopardized by holding
section 8(d) applicable.
B.

The Bankruptcy Amendments and FederalJudgeship Act of 1984:
Providing the Necessary Structurefor the Rejection of a
Collective BargainingAgreement after Bildisco

1. The StandardforRejection of the Collective BargainingAgreement
Bildisco and the Bankruptcy Amendments Act 231' require that a bankruptcy court permit rejection of a collective bargaining agreement if the
debtor can demonstrate that the contract burdens the estate and that the
equities balance in favor of rejection of the labor contract.2 32 In arriving
at this conclusion, the Court and Congress correctly recognized the special
225. Id.
226. Id; see supra note 83 (citing to instances where unions aided their troubled employers to avoid liquidation of the firm and the consequent loss of jobs).

227. 104 S. Ct. at 1210.
228. Id at 1210-11.
229. Id at 1211.
230. Id
231. In enacting the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, Congress accepted the Bildisco analysis and conclusion with respect to the appropriate standard to apply in ruling on an application to reject a labor contract. See supra notes 66, 78. With respect to this issue, therefore,
the following examination of Bildisco is also applicable to the Bankruptcy Amendments Act.
232. See 104 S. Ct. at 1196, supra notes 66, 78 and accompanying text. It is not clear
under the Bankruptcy Amendments Act whether a bankruptcy court or a district court will
rule on the application to reject the contract. See supra note 72.
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nature of the collective bargaining contract and the consequent need to
impose a stricter standard of scrutiny than the business judgment rule.233
This elevated degree of scrutiny is necessary in order to accommodate the
competing policies of the Code and the NLRA.2 34 Nevertheless, Congress
and the Court should have sought not only to reconcile the competing policies, but should have done so with as little violence to one as is consonant
with preserving the other.2 35
a. A Statutory Analysis
Having rejected the business judgment test, the Court turned its attention to the Kevin Steel 236 and REA Express 237 tests, both of which accommodated the policies of the Code and the NLRA, as possible standards to
apply in ruling on a rejection petition. The Court implied that neither test
properly harmonized the competing statutory policies.23 8 It buried the
REA Express test by simply noting that the evidentiary burden associated
with this stricter standard,23 9 although not insurmountable, would pose
difficulties to the debtor in possession.2 40 The Court's cursory treatment of
these potential difficulties and its summary acceptance of the Kevin Steel
balancing of the equities test 24 1 provide an analytically insufficient basis
for rejecting the P.EA Express test. From a standpoint of statutory accommodation, however, the rejection of the REA Express test by the Court and
Congress was warranted.
In reconciling the competing statutory policies, the Court grafted a new
requirement onto the Kevin Steel standard. It announced that, before the
bankruptcy court permits rejection of the collective bargaining agreement,
it must be persuaded that reasonable efforts have been expended to negotiate a voluntary modification of the agreement.2 42 Further, the Bankruptcy
233.
234.

See supra notes 66, 78, 164 and accompanying text.
See Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195-96.

235. See id at 1204. See generallyl Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); United
States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939).
236. See supra notes 96-99, 105 and accompanying text.
237.

See supra note 117 and accompanying text.

238. 104 S. Ct. at 1195-97. After rejecting the stringent REA Express test, the Court
supplemented the Kevin Steel balancing of the equities test with a bargaining requirement.
See supra notes 173-74 and infra note 242 and accompanying text.

239. The Third Circuit, when addressing the REA Express standard, asserted that there
was an associated evidentiary problem-it might be impossible to predict the outcome of the

reorganization until very late into the arrangement. 682 F.2d at 80; see supra note 51.
240. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
241. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.

242. 104 S. Ct. at 1196. It should be noted that this bargaining requirement extended the
lower court's ruling that only required the employer to bargain with the union after the
contract was rejected. See 682 F.2d at 80.
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Amendments Act, although demanding compliance with a more structured
negotiation process, in actuality requires no more than the bargaining efforts mandated by Bildisco.2 43 This good faith requirement arguably falls
short of adequately accommodating the underlying Code and NLRA policies. It invites abuse of the bankruptcy procedure by those who would file
chapter 11 proceedings not primarily for the purpose of reorganization, but
to unnecessarily abrogate a labor contract or to gain bargaining
leverage.24 4
Harmony between the Code and the NLRA would be maximized, however, if the debtor in possession were required instead to "bargain to impasse" with the union prior to receiving permission to reject the contract.
"Bargaining to impasse" is the generally accepted standard required of
parties in negotiating a labor contract.2 45 It is applied by courts to maintain the integrity of the duty to bargain in good faith under the NLRA.2 46
The requirement of bargaining to impasse, which is stricter than the "reasonable efforts" or "good faith" standards,2 47 is fulfilled when the parties
243. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § I 13(b)(2), supra notes 66, 70 and accompanying text. Bildisco requires that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have
been made. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text. The Bankruptcy Amendments
Act similarly request the parties to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith. See
Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 1113(b)(2), supra note 66.
244. Within the past several years there have been several major bankruptcy filings by
relatively healthy companies. On September 24, 1983, Continental Airlines filed in bankruptcy. Brownstein, Going Bankrupt-Is it Just a Way to Get Out of Labor Contracts, 15
NAT'L J. 2353 (Nov. 12, 1983). At the time of the filing, however, Continental had $62
million in cash reserves. -d. at 2354. The President of Continental related that the corporation's "sole problem was labor." Id Further, companies are using the threat of going into
bankruptcy as a routine component of requests for wage concessions. See id at 2353. Finally, some companies are entering bankruptcy not on the basis of current insolvency but on
the threat of future insolvency. One notable example is the Manville Company, which entered bankruptcy claiming that the 16,500 product liability suits pending against the company would cause its collapse. Cooper, Bankruptcy's Thriving Business, 41 CONG. Q. 863
(Nov. 18, 1983). Nevertheless, many business executives and labor specialists maintain that
there will not be a rash of bankruptcy filings due to the social stigma associated with filing
for bankruptcy. See Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1984, at I, col. 6.
245. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
246. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
157 (1977); B. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 127 (1980) ("The duty to bargain
arises as soon as the union is certified by the [NLRB] or recognized voluntarily by the employer--even before formal contract negotiations begin. The employer must bargain to impasse before making a change in any mandatory subject of bargaining."); see also NLRB v.
Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). Katz reveals the basic duty to bargain to impasse even though the
parties have yet to conclude negotiations on an initial contract. Id at 743. This duty, then,
remains applicable even under Bildisco's holding that the collective bargaining agreement
becomes unenforceable once the bankruptcy petition is filed because in both situations, there
is no enforceable contract.
247. See supra notes 66, 70, 173-75 and accompanying text; R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON
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have exhausted all prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussion has become fruitless.2 4' Thus, an employer's unilateral change in
employment conditions prior to impasse violates section 8(a)(5) as it effectively circumvents the duty to bargain and amounts to a flat refusal to
negotiate.2 49 This stricter bargaining requirement should apply in the
bankruptcy context because, when compared with the "reasonable efforts"
standard, it comports more closely with the actual bargaining duty of the
parties even within the context of Bildisco's "unenforceable contract" theory. It should be noted that this theory and the entirety of the Bildisco
holding retain vitality with respect to bankruptcy cases pending as of the
date of the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act.25° Under the
"unenforceable contract" theory, the status of the post-petition, unenforceable collective bargaining agreement is analogous to that of an expired
labor contract, neither of which is immediately enforceable. The bargaining to impasse requirement, therefore, would not be inconsistent with the
majority's reasoning. Finally, in the view of the NLRB and most courts,
an employer, after bargaining to impasse, may unilaterally modify the
446-50 (1976). Gorman states that, after bargaining to impasse, an employer's
announcement unilaterally implementing changes is no longer viewed as either an avoidance of the duty to bargain or as a disparagement of the representative status of the union
because the employer has complied with the requirements of the NLRA.
248. The NLRB has stated that an employer violates his duty to bargain if:
when negotiations are sought or are in progress, he unilaterally institutes changes
in existing terms and conditions of employment. On the other hand, after bargaining to an impasse, that is, after good faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement, an employer does not violate the Act by making
unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within his preimpasse
proposals.
Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1965); see also NLRB v. Webb Furniture
Corp., 366 F.2d 314, 316 (4th Cir. 1966); Dallas General Drivers Local 745 v. NLRB, 355
F.2d 842, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Whether "bargaining to impasse" has occurred is a factual
determination. Taft noted several points of observation to aid in this determination: "Itihe
bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, [and] the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations .... ." Taft
Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. at 478. After impasse is reached, however, the employer
may institute unilateral changes that are no more favorable than it previously offered prior
to impasse. Cf. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) (unilateral changes after the expiration of a contract cannot be instituted prior to impasse). Although not expressly mandated
by the Bankruptcy Amendments Act, it has been suggested that the court should not award
interim, emergency modifications beyond the proposal made by the trustee. See supra note
79 and accompanying text. Thus, depending on how the courts interpret § 1113(e) of the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act, the ultimate effect of the bargaining to impasse requireinent
may be incorporated into the new legislation.
249. See Katz, 369 U.S. at 743; NLRB v. Newberry Equip. Co., 401 F.2d 604 (8th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Consolidated Rendering Co., 386 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1967).
250. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 541(c), supra note 66.
LABOR LAW,
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contract. Thus, the bargaining to impasse duty would lend support to the
Court's ruling that the debtor in possession does not commit an unfair
labor practice when it unilaterally modifies the agreement prior to receiv25
ing formal permission to reject it. '
From an equity-oriented standpoint, however, the Bankruptcy Amendments Act and the Bildisco standard for rejecting an agreement falls short
of achieving the optimum balance between labor and bankruptcy legislation and between the interests of employees and creditors. Employees risk
irreparable injury upon the breach of a contract. A collective bargaining
agreement normally provides employees with many nonmonetary rights
that govern the industrial order and the economic security of the workers.
These benefits include seniority rights, pension rights, grievance and arbitration rights, and no-strike/no-lockout rights. 252 When a labor contract is
rejected, these substantial rights are no longer enforceable. Although the
debtor's rejection may constitute a breach for which monetary damages
may be awarded,25 3 such damages are clearly inadequate to compensate
employees for the loss of these rights. 254 Moreover, employees are wholly
dependent upon their employer for their wages. Creditors, on the other
251. See supra note 246. In those pending situations where the Bankruptcy Amendments
Act is inapplicable and the employer is verifiably incapable of surviving a negotiation process through to impasse, the debtor in possession should be permitted to receive an expedited bankruptcy court hearing, wherein, after a sufficient demonstration of financial
hardship and good faith reasonable efforts to renegotiate, the debtor may request permission
to reject a collective bargaining agreement. Relaxing the bargaining to impasse requirement
realistically acknowledges the situation of many chapter I I debtors. Where the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act is applicable, § 1113(e) of the Bankruptcy Amendments permits the court
to authorize the business to make interim alterations in the labor contract to avoid irreparable harm. See supra notes 66, 79, 249 and accompanying text. This procedure may be implemented during the negotiations prior to rejection application being filed or any other time
"when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect." Bankruptcy Amendments
Act § 1113(e), supra note 66. The availability of such an emergency relief provision would
permit the application of this stricter statutorily appropriate standard with minimal risk of
the debtor being forced into liquidation. The burden, however, will be on the employer to
establish that absent the interim alterations pending the outcome of the negotiations, the
company will be forced into liquidation. Id. Although not expressly provided, the applicable standard the court will use to determine whether interim alterations are appropriate is
probably REA Express. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 99. The focus of this section concerns the irreparable hardships associated with the rejection of a labor contract. Because the fair and equitable treatment requirement of § 1 13(b)( I)(A) applies only with respect to the debtor's proposal for contract
modifications, it will not help protect the employee's lost nonmonetary rights when the labor
agreement is rejected. See supra note 66-70, 76-78 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 138, 151.
254. Courts have frequently noted that employees cannot obtain adequate relief when a
labor contract is rejected. See BradaMiller, 702 F.2d at 899-900; In re Southern Electronics
Co., 23 Bankr. 348, 363 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
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hand, generally spread their risk among numerous customers. Creditors
are also in a better position than employees to mitigate their losses by ceasing performance. The only viable recourse available to employees is the
strike, which may become economically impossible to sustain.2 55 Thus, in
light of the unique hardships that may be imposed on employees, the
Bildisco and Bankruptcy Amendments Act balancing of the equities standard is inadequate. Under this standard, it appears that most collective
bargaining agreements will be rejected. The majority of debtors should be
able to prove that the contract burdens the estate simply by showing a high
union wage scale and a consequent deprivation of assets. Additionally, the
structured negotiation procedure established by the Bankruptcy Amendments may not preclude a debtor desiring to reject a labor contract from
accomplishing this purpose. Many terms were broadly defined in order to
provide the debtor with the needed flexibility to survive the reorganization."' Although a qualitative balancing of the interests test, similar to
that proposed by Bildisco,2" theoretically will consider the unique interests of the employees, it will not protect these interests to the same extent
as the REA Express test.
b. The "PartialRejection" Resolution
In order to protect these nonmonetary interests and maintain the legislatively mandated balancing of the equities test, the courts should consider
permitting the partial rejection of collective bargaining agreements. It is a
well-established principle, however, that commercial contracts cannot be
partially rejected. 258 The requirement of "total rejection" is designed to
prevent the debtor from retaining only the favorable features of a contract
255. See, e.g., Greenhouse Unions Pressedon "Givebacks",N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1984, at

D2, col. 1. Although not a bankruptcy situation, the recent Greyhound strike exemplifies
the ability of the employer to outlast striking employees, even when the balance seemed to
favor a union victory and competitors were scrambling to take away Greyhound's business.
Nevertheless, the union was forced into a 7.8% wage cut. Continental Airlines is an example
of a company that filed for bankruptcy yet managed to outlast a strike by its employees. See
supra notes 216, 246.
256. For instance, it has been suggested that the "necessary modifications" provision applying to the debtors proposal could be satisfied even when requesting a complete termination of the contract. See supra note 76.
257. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
258. See In re Lyntex Corp., 403 F. Supp. 284, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting 6 COLLIER
is axiomatic that an executory contract
3.24 at 596 (14th ed. 1978)) ("[Ilt
ON BANKRUPTCY
'cannot be rejected piece-meal; it must be rejected in its entirety or not at all.' "); In re M & S
Amusement Enter., 122 F. Supp. 364 (D. Del. 1954); In re Standard Furniture Co., 3 Bankr.
527 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980); 2 BKR. L. ED. CODE COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS § 15:103
(1983).
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while rejecting the unfavorable ones.25 9 This rule also has been applied to
collective bargaining agreements. 26' Nevertheless, the totality requirement
should be inapplicable to the area of rejection of collective bargaining
agreements in a chapter 11 proceeding where the goal is to successfully
rehabilitate the debtor company. Were a court permitted to approve the
rejection of only the onerous, monetary wage and benefit provisions, a major financial burden on most debtors in possession would be assuaged,
thereby facilitating the reorganization. Moreover, by requiring the retention of the less burdensome, nonmonetary provisions,2 6' the court would
be showing respect for the labor laws, thereby promoting increased union
cooperation. This "partial rejection" approach, therefore, would facilitate
262
the successful reorganization of the debtor company.
2. The Unfair Labor Practice Issue
The majority, the dissent, and the NLRB agreed that the debtor in possession need not comply with the protracted termination and modification
procedures before seeking permission to reject the contract from the bankruptcy court.26 3 These lengthy procedures are not consistent with the need

for an expeditious adjustment of the contract should it be necessary to ensure a successful reorganization. 2 ' Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Amendments Act reflects the recognized need for expedition in the rejection
process by providing specific time constraints for judicial consideration of
a rejection petition.26 5 Further, an employer's unilateral implementation
of changes in the agreement without a prior court hearing, permitted under
Bildisco,2 66 is strictly forbidden under the Bankruptcy Amendments
Act.267 An analysis of the Court's reasoning in Bildisco will serve to confirm the necessity for the Bankruptcy Amendments Act legislation precluding the unilateral alteration or termination of the labor agreement
259. See In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).

260. Id.
26 1. See supra note 99.

262. Minimal weight should be accorded the Klaber Bros. decision, supra note 259. In
that case, the court did not acknowledge the special nature of a collective bargaining agreement and permitted rejection using the antiquated "business judgment" standard. 173 F.
Supp. at 85.
263. See 104 S. Ct. at 1204 n.9 and Brief for NLRB at 41. Justice Brennan, for instance,
noted in a footnote that he would not require the debtor in possession to comply with the
notice requirements and waiting periods of section 8(d) before seeking rejection. 104 S. Ct.
at 1204 n.9.
264. See supra note 13.
265. See supra notes 66, 73-75 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 179-93 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 66, 71-75 and accompanying text.
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immediately after filing the bankruptcy petition. The concept of court approval of rejection prior to the implementation of wage and benefit alterations, however, is not as rigidly established due to the interim modification
provision 268 and the thirty-day unilateral modification condition. 269 Although enacted as emergency relief provisons, 27 ° depending on judicial interpretation of the provisions, their eventual effect may be to perpetuate
the spirit of Bildisco.
As will be developed below, the Bildisco Court's holding that the NLRB
may not find that the debtor committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally changing the terms of the agreement during the period following the
filing of the bankruptcy petition and before the bankruptcy court authorizes rejection is not supported by the policies and provisions of the Code
or the NLRA. There are two basic flaws with the majority's reasoning.
First, the Court failed to develop effectively its "unenforceable contract'271 theory. Instead of removing the employer from the labor agreement, as the "new entity" theory attempted,27 2 the "unenforceable
contract" theory merely accomplishes the reverse by rendering the labor
agreement inoperative.2 73 Second, the Court failed to examine carefully
the conflicting goals and provisions of the Code and the NLRA.2 74 The
majority, inconsistent with its scrutiny of the standard for the rejection of a
labor contract, devoted the vast majority of its discussion to the policies
and provisions of the Code alone. 275 As the dissent aptly noted, such an
incomplete analytical approach naturally results in a predetermined conclusion that section 8(d) is inapplicable.2 76 Thus, the provisions and policies of the Code and the NLRA support the Bankruptcy Amendments Act
legislation incorporating the notion that the contract is "in effect." The
significance of this concept is that, not only may unilateral changes without court approval give rise to contract claims as administrative expenses, 277 such changes might also give rise to unfair labor practice
charges because the alterations are unprotected modifications of employ268. See supra notes 66, 79 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 66, 81 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 79, 81 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 92-95, 113 and accompanying text.
273. 104 S. Ct. at 1199. The majority stated that "the filing of the petition in bankruptcy
means that the collective-bargaining agreement is no longer enforceable, and may never be
enforceable again." Id
274. See id at 1203-04 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
275. In its opinion, the majority, while addressing the unfair labor practice issue, devoted
less than one full paragraph to the policies of the NLRA. See 104 S. Ct. at 1200.
276. Id at 1204 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
277. See supra notes 138, 151.
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ment terms in violation of section 8(d).27 8
a. Statutory Examination
The statutory language of the Code and the NLRA support the holding
that the agreement is "in effect" for the purposes of section 8(d). As the
dissent noted, should the debtor elect to assume the contract, this assumption relates back to the time of the filing of the petition. 279 Thus, any
wages earned by the employees under the contract become a first-priority
administrative expense. 280 Even if the contract is rejected, some of the
damages arising from the breach will originate in the employer's obligations under the agreement.28 ' Thus, as the dissent also noted, the postpetition collective bargaining agreement will support a claim whether or
not it is rejected. The agreement should, therefore, be deemed in effect for
the purposes of section 8(d).282
The plain language of the NLRA also supports the proposition that
Congress did not intend the filing of a bankruptcy petition to affect the
applicability of section 8(d). The debtor in possession is an employer
within the meaning of the NLRA.28 3 Section 8(a)(5) further imposes a
duty to bargain on employers.28 4 The requirements of section (d) form
part of that duty.285 The logical inference is that Congress intended the
debtor in possession to be subject to the strictures of section 8(d).
Arguably, the majority incorrectly analyzed the purpose and relevance
of section 365(g)(1), which relates the breach of the contract back to the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.2 86 It concluded that this section limits the debtor in possession's liability to the reasonable value of the
services performed and that the debtor is not responsible for its obligations
under the contract. 28 7 The legislative history, however, confirms that the
purpose of section 365(g)(1) is to ensure that the claims based on the rejection of executory contracts are treated as prepetition claims or general unsecured claims. 288 Consequently, section 365(g)(1) refers only to the
278. See C. Montgomery, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements, The Legislative Solution 19 (Aug. 7, 1984) (prepared for American Bar Ass'n Labor Section Meeting).
279. 104 S. Ct. at 1206.
280. See supra note 138.
281. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 12.
284.

Id

285. See supra notes 12, 13.
286.

See supra note 32.

287. 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
288.

See supra notes 32, 138.
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priority of the claims based on rejection of the contract, and not to the
existence of the contract in the post-petition period. The court's reliance,
therefore, on this section to find the contract unenforceable or not "in effect" is misplaced.2 8 9 Thus, from a statutory perspective, the Bankruptcy
Amendments Act serves to clarify the congressional intent misinterpreted
by the Supreme Court.
b.

Policy Examination

The policies of the NLRA and the Code also support the conclusion that
section 8(d) is applicable during the post-petition period when the debtor
is seeking to modify or terminate a collective bargaining agreement. A
fundamental aim of the NLRA is the maintenance of industrial peace, accomplished through the promotion of collective bargaining. The requirements of section 8(d), components of the duty to bargain,2 90 are designed
specifically to prevent the industrial strife that would result from the unilateral modification of labor contracts by employers. Such a modification
is equivalent to a circumvention of collective bargaining.2 9 ' It is reasonable to conclude that the threat to industrial peace is as pressing the day
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition as the day before.29 2 The Court's
conclusion that the policies of the NLRA, although admittedly undermined by its holding, are somehow less frustrated by the requirement that
the employer must still bargain with the employees' representatives after
289. It is well established that the contractual obligations of the debtor continue to exist
during the period following the chapter 11 petition. The court in Truck Drivers Local No.

807 v. Bohack Corp. stated that "[i]f the contract is rejected by the bankruptcy court, it will
be deemed to have been breached as of the date of the filing of the petition in chapter 11.
But like any other unilateral breach of contract, it does not destroy the contract .... "
Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312, 321 n.15 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); see
also In re W.T. Grant Co., 620 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,446 U.S. 983 (1980); In re
Unishops, Inc., 553 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1977).

Perhaps as a fallback argument, the majority, inconsistent with its "unenforceable contract" theory, addressed the application of § 8(d), specifically focusing on the fact that a
violation of this provision requires a unilateral modification by a party to the collective bargaining agreement. See supra note 13. This discussion would be totally unnecessary were
the "unenforceable contract" theory viable because there would be no agreement to which

§ 8(d) could be applied. In any event, the Court stated that the modification in the agreement was "accomplished not by the employer's unilateral action, but rather by operation of
law."

104 S. Ct. at 1200. This was the same reasoning the lower courts used to find the

debtor in possession a "new entity" and thus not bound to any contract. See supra notes 9298, 113 and accompanying text. The Court, however, expressly rejected this "new entity"
analysis earlier in its opinion. 104 S. Ct. at 1197. The Court's inconsistency with regard to
this fiction hints at its insecurity with the "unenforceable contract" theory.
290. See supra notes 12, 13.
291. See supra note 13.
292.

104 S. Ct. at 1208.
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unilateral modification by the debtor in possession or following formal rejection approval by the bankruptcy court,2 93 therefore, is insufficient in
light of the possibility of destructive, economic warfare.
The policies of the Code also permit the application of section 8(d). A
debtor in possession certainly needs the option to reject executory contracts. The right, however, to modify the agreement unlawfully is not necessary in securing a successful reorganization. Where a labor contract is so
burdensome that even temporary adherence to its terms would be fatal to
the company, the debtor may seek immediate rejection through the Bankruptcy Amendments Act's application of time limits for judicial consideration of a rejection application. Under the balancing of the equities test
now embodied in the Code, the rejection petition should be granted.2 94
3. Practical Consequences of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984
Congress enacted the labor section of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act
with the intention of reversing the Supreme Court's ruling that the debtor
in possession does not commit an unfair labor practice when, after filing a
bankruptcy petition yet prior to receiving judicial permission to reject the
contract, it unilaterally modifies or terminates the collective bargaining
agreement.2 95 Thus, foremost among Congress' changes to the Code was
the incorporation of a rejection procedure wherein an employer is not permitted to unilaterally alter the contract without judicial approval.29 6
This important aspect of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act reflects Congress' desire to safeguard the policies of the NLRA by perpetuating the
293. Id. at 1200.
294. There is also a fundamental unfairness in allowing the debtor to unilaterally modify
the agreement in violation of § 8(d). Rejection of a contract operates to retroactively cancel
the terms of an agreement. See supra note 32. This retroactivity insulates the debtor from
liability on the contract. The debtor could be disadvantaged only if the court refused to
permit rejection. If rejection is approved, the debtor would then be responsible only for the
prepetition terms of the contract. See Countryman, supranote 95, at 484; Fogel, supra note
209, at 376. Debtors, therefore, are encouraged to disregard contractual obligations far in
advance of when they would be entitled to reject the contract. Further, there is no incentive
for the employer to bargain with the union over the contract modification-at least not
beyond the minimal "reasonable efforts" standard promulgated by the majority. Without
the ability to condemn the unilateral modification of the contract by the debtor as an unfair
labor practice, the NLRB would be powerless to preclude debtors from modifying their
contracts at the first opportunity. The inevitable result would be industrial strife. Thus, the
Bankruptcy Amendments Act's general provision requiring a judicial ruling on a rejection
petition prior to contract modification revitalizes § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) of the NLRA in the
bankruptcy context. See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 11 3(d)(1), (d)(2), supra note 66.
295. See supra notes 66, 81, 179-93 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 60, 71-78 and accompanying text.
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equality in bargaining power between the representatives of the company
and the representatives of labor.29 7 Moreover, the requirements of a judicial hearing and ruling prior to contract rejection and modification further
promote the basic policy of the NLRA by encouraging the collective bargaining process.2 98 The new legislation precludes an employer from entering bankruptcy and immediately unilaterally altering the terms of the
labor agreement-an action equivalent to a circumvention of the duty to
bargain. Thus, if judicial enforcement of the new modification procedures
of the Code is consistent with declared congressional intent, the courts will
consequently discourage bad faith bankruptcy filings by companies299that
desire merely to cancel or significantly modify their labor contracts.
In order, however, to accommodate the Code's policy of granting the
debtor sufficient flexibility to survive the reorganization process, 30 0 Congress incorporated into the Bankruptcy Amendments Act two emergency
relief mechanisms:
(1) under section 1113(e), after notice that satisfies the needs of the
trustee, and a hearing, the court may authorize interim modifications of
the labor contract where essential to the continuation of the debtor's business; 30 1 and
(2) pursuant to section 11 13(d)(2), if the court fails to rule on the rejection application within thirty days of the commencement of the rejection
hearing, the debtor may unilaterally alter or terminate any of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending the court's
decision. 3 °2
Depending upon judicial interpretation of the new legislation, the practical results of the inclusion of these exceptions may be the continuation of
the spirit of Bildisco where the Supreme Court permitted contract modification immediately after the filing of the bankruptcy petition.30 3 Under
Bildisco, the debtor could enjoy the benefits of his contract modification
throughout the period prior to the court's ruling on the rejection application. If the contract were subsequently rejected, the employees had general unsecured claims for damages arising from the breach. 3° If the
contract were not rejected, the employees were entitled to any compensa297. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
298. Id
299. See supra notes 68-82, 216, 244.
300. See supra note 7.

301.
302.
303.
304.

See Bankruptcy
See Bankruptcy
See supra notes
See supra notes

Amendments Act § 1113(e), supra note 66.
Amendments Act § I 13(d)(2), supra note 66.
179-93 and accompanying text.
138, 151.
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tion lost because of the contract modification as a first priority administrative expense.3 °5
The situation may be similar under the Bankruptcy Amendments Act.
Immediately after the filing of a bankruptcy petition the debtor may request interim modifications of the labor contract pending a ruling on the
rejection application. 3 6 Although the language of the statute appears to
demand strict scrutiny of such requests, it would seem fairly easy for a
debtor to assert that the contract alterations are essential to the survival of
the business and even more difficult for a court to deny such a request
based on the record of an expedited hearing and a consideration of the
policy behind the inclusion of this emergency relief provision. Similar to
the situation under Bildisco, if the court subsequently permits rejection of
the contract, which is just as probable under the Bankruptcy Amendments
Act as Bildisco because the court will apply the same balancing of the equities test, 30 7 the employees will merely have general unsecured claims for
damages.30 8 If the court does not approve contract rejection, the employees will have a right to lost wages and benefits as administrative expenses.30 9 In either case, therefore, it is to the debtor's advantage to seek
interim modifications of the contract to enjoy the benefits of lower labor
costs for the interim period. The ultimate result of such a strategy is similar under Bildisco or the new amendments.
Further, should the court fail to rule on the rejection application within
the prescribed time limits, the debtor may initiate any unilateral contract
modifications desired.31 0 It has been suggested that a debtor operating
within that scenario is in essentially the same position as he was under
Bildisco.31 ' Thus, in spite of the declared intention of Congress to prohibit
unilateral contract modifications, it seems the practical result of the Bankruptcy Amendments Act may be merely the creation of a more structured
environment that will make Bildisco contract modifications more difficult,
yet certainly not impossible or improbable.
III.

CONCLUSION

In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that, before a bankruptcy court acts on a petition to reject a collective bar305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra notes 138, 206 and accompanying text.
See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § 1 113(e), supra notes 66, 79.
See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § i 13(c)(3), supra notes 66, 78.
See supra note 138.
Id
See Bankruptcy Amendments Act § I1 13(d)(2), supra notes 66, 81.
See supra note 81.
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gaining agreement, it must be persuaded that reasonable efforts have been
made to negotiate a voluntary modification of the agreement and that
these efforts are not likely to result in a successful solution. Further, the
Court defined the standard that the bankruptcy court must use in determining whether the labor contract may be rejected: the debtor must show
that the contract is burdensome to the estate and that the equities balance
in favor of rejection. Finally, the Court held that the NLRB may not find
the debtor guilty of an unfair labor practice for modifying a collective bargaining agreement before formal approval to reject is granted by the bankruptcy court. Although the Court attempted to accommodate the Code
and the NLRA in arriving at the standard for rejection, it opened the door
to the possibility that bankruptcy proceedings could be used to effect the
abrogation of labor contracts.
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 attempts to preclude the use of bankruptcy proceedings as a means of canceling a collective bargaining agreement. The Bankruptcy Amendments
Act demands compliance with a more structured negotiation process than
the "reasonable efforts" required under Bildisco before a rejection application will even be entertained. Further, it is only after these negotiations
fail that a court will become involved, ruling on a rejection petition within
the time constraints imposed by the amendment. At any time in this process, however, a debtor may petition the court for such interim contract
modifications as are necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the reorganizing business. In the event that the court does not rule on the rejection
application within the prescribed time limits, the debtor may unilaterally
modify or terminate the labor agreement pending the outcome of the
court's ruling. Finally, the Bankruptcy Amendments Act preserves the application of Bildisco with respect to cases pending as of the date of enactment of the new legislation. Thus, the Supreme Court's holdings are not
without continued vitality.
The Bankruptcy Amendments Act incorporates the contract rejection
standard propounded by the Supreme Court. The Bildisco standard is statutorily appropriate, except that "bargaining to impasse," instead of simply
"reasonable efforts" toward negotiating contract modifications, should be
required of the debtor before a bankruptcy court will permit rejection.
The "balancing of the equities" requirement is too broad, enabling a bankruptcy court to reject the contract in almost any instance. Under Bildisco,
the many intangible, noncompensable benefits that employees receive
from the collective bargaining agreement are in jeopardy.
Considerations of practicality mandate that the section 8(d) procedures
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for contract modification, such as the extensive waiting periods, be set
aside for the sake of expeditiousness when seeking court approval for rejection. Nevertheless, in permitting the debtor unilaterally to modify the
collective bargaining agreement prior to rejection approval, with only
nominal bargaining, the Court incorrectly subordinated the most basic
precepts of the NLRA. The Bankruptcy Amendments Act, which strives
to preclude unilateral modification of the labor agreement prior to a court
ruling, therefore constitutes a sound accommodation of the competing policies of the Code and the NLRA. With the inclusion of the emergency
contract alteration relief provisions, however, and the Supreme Court's application of the balancing of the equities test for contract rejection, the
practical results of the bankruptcy amendments may be the creation of a
structured process that will make Bildisco modifications more difficult, yet
not impossible or improbable. The lower courts now face the task of applying the Bankruptcy Amendments Act and ensuring the effectuation of
the congressional goal of precluding Bildisco unilateral contract modifications while preserving the integrity of the reorganization effort.
Christopher Capuano

